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Reply to Altn oi Q" 1 March 1992
Honorable Richard H. Truly
Administrator
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Admiral Truly:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is again pleased to submit its Annual
Report. This report covers the period from February 1991 through January 1992 and
provides you with findings, recommendations, and supporting material. We ask you to
respond only to Section II, "Findings and Recommendations."
During the past year, we have been gratified by the continued prudent approach NASA
has shown with respect to Space Shuttle operations. We also are encouraged by the
improvements we have seen, particularly in the area of Shuttle processing. Although
more work needs to be done in this area, you certainly appear to be on the right track.
We also view the revised Space Station Freedom Program as a welcome improvement
and a realistic course to follow.
In spite of these gains, however, we are distressed by the actions taken with respect to
the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). In particular, we disagree with the decision to
cancel the development of the hydrogen alternate turbopump and large throat main
combustion chamber. It is the Panel's consensus that improvements such as these are
indispensable to the safe continuation of the Space Shuttle Program for the next 20 to 30
years and would contribute more to safety and reliability than any other identified
propulsion improvement. In fact, we consider a comprehensive and continuing program
of safety and reliability improvements in all areas of Space Shuttle hardware and
software to be an essential component of maintaining successful operations. As a safety
advisory panel, we cannot support the elimination of important safety and reliability
improvements and urge you to reconsider the advanced turbopump and large throat
main combustion chamber projects.
Very truly yours,
Norman R. Parmet
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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L INTRODUCTION

IINTRODUCTION
In 1991, NASA continued successful
Space Shuttle flights and restructured
the Space Station Freedom Program
(SSFP) with a downsized design. This
design involved significantly lower
technological and operational risks than
the earlier versions. The Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)
monitored these activities as well as
NASA_s aeronautical programs at NASA
installations and contractor facilities.
Specific topics that were examined in-
depth by the Panel included Space
Station organization, Space Shuttle
structures, Space Shuttle processing,
design and manufacturing plans for the
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM),
Space Shuttle landing performance and
the need for an operational autoland
capability, Space Shuttle logistics, loads
and overhaul plans, and aeronautical
flight research programs.
The results of the Panel's activities are
presented, as in previous years, in a set
of findings and recommendations, which
are in Section II of this report. Section
III is composed of "Information in
Support of Findings and
Recommendations." Appendices in
Section IV provide a listing of Panel
members, the NASA response to the
findings and recommendations contained
in last year's report, and a chronology of
the Panel's activities during the
reporting period.
This report highlights both
improvements in NAS._s safety and
reliability activities and specific areas
where additional gains might be
realized. One area of particular
concern involves the curtailment or
elimination of Space Shuttle safety and
reliability enhancements; it is addressed
by several findings and
recommendations. The Panel considers
this essential to the continued successful
operation of the Space Shuttle.
Therefore, it is recommended herein
that a comprehensive and continuing
program of safety and reliability
improvements in all areas of Space
Shuttle hardware/software be
considered an inherent component of
ongoing Space Shuttle operations.
During 1991, Joseph E Sutter retired
from the Panel after serving as its
Chairman and, most recently, as a
consultant to it. Paul M. Johnstone and
John A. Gorham joined the Panel as
consultants.
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II
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION FREEDOM PROGRAM
Finding #1: During the past 1½ years,
Space Station Freedom (SSF) has
undergone a reconfiguration involving
many technical changes and program
deferrals. These changes were
highlighted in the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel's (ASAP's) March 1991
report. Some of the changes affect risk
and safety while others influence
serviceability and usefulness.
Nevertheless, the SSF design that has
emerged is more realistic and capable of
supporting a stable development
program.
Recommendation #1: Safety and risk
considerations should remain of
paramount importance in the
development of the reconfigured Space
Station.
Finding #2: The ASAP March 1991
Annual Report characterized the Space
Station Freedom Program (SSFP) as
plagued with technical and managerial
difficulties and lacking an effective
systems engineering and integration
organization. Significant developments
have occurred in the ensuing year. In
particular, there has been a clarification
of system engineering and systems
integration responsibilities among NASA
Headquarters and the Centers. Also,
key managerial assignments have been
delegated to appropriate Centers. The
new arrangement benefits the program
by drawing on the substantial technical
expertise of the Centers' staff members
not specifically assigned to the SSFP.
Recommendation #2: The changes
introduced in the systems engineering
and integration management areas
should be monitored to ensure that the
new arrangement is effective and that
maximum use is made of each Center's
particular capabilities.
Finding #3: NAS/SLs current policy is
not to leave a crew on the Space Station
without an attached Space Shuttle or
other assured return capability. At
present, there is no program to develop
a dedicated assured return vehicle.
However, using an Orbiter as an assured
return vehicle on long-duration missions
reduces the number of Space Shuttles
available for other purposes and raises
potential safety and reliability issues.
Recommendation #3: NASA should
continue studies to explore various
options for assuring a safe return
capability from SSF leading to the
selection of a preferred option in a
timely manner.
Finding #4: Use of preintegrated truss
(PIT) sections for SSF greatly simplifies
on-orbit assembly. However, the
capture latch, guide pins, and motorized
bolts used to couple the assemblies may
not always be in proper alignment. This
could lead to damaging the guide pins
or bolts thereby precluding mating.
Recommendation #4: The PIT
development program should consider
actual hardware tests to verify the
i
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assembly process to be used in orbit.
These tests should encompass the full
range of misalignments, tolerances, and
impacts that might reasonably be
expected to occur when the truss is
assembled with the actual equipment
and procedures to be used.
Finding #5: Software for the Data
Management System (DMS) represents
one of the major challenges to meeting
the intensive delta design review (DDR)
schedule.
Recommendation _ 5: The DMS
software development process should be
monitored closely to ensure it is
compatible with the existing DDR
schedules.
B. SPACE SHUTrLE PROGRAM
ORBITER
Finding #6: The results of flight tests
indicate that the turbulent flow over the
body flap creates a spectrum of hinge
moments greater than that used in the
original structural fatigue analysis. It
also has been determined that an
additional load path exists from the flap
to the supporting structure. Further, the
flap actuators were found to be more
flexible than originally assumed.
Additional tests are to be conducted to
evaluate hinge moments and actuator
flexibility.
Recommendation _6: NASA should
evaluate, as rapidly as possible, the
results of the new tests and loads
analyses to reestablish the allowable
number of flights for the body flap.
Finding #7" NASA has developed a
Shuttle Modal Inspection System (SMIS)
for detecting changes in stiffness in
structural/mechanical systems due to
factors such as wear or cracking. The
SMIS has shown good results when used
on the Orbiter body flap and elevon
systems (including actuators and
supporting structures). However,_t is
not a complete replacement for more
conventional nondestructive inspection
(NDI) methods. These conventional
methods are capable of detecting cracks
in primary structures with a "critical
crack length" too small to cause a
detectable change in stiffness and hence
be measurable by SMIS.
Recommendation _ 7: The SMIS
procedure should be used only to
augment more conventional NDI
methods.
Finding #8: Thermal protection system
tiles are inspected for damage after
every flight by specially trained and
highly experienced inspectors using
tactile techniques. These inspectors
determine if the tiles are loose and help
to identify problems in step and gap.
The current procedure is largely
qualitative and highly dependent on the
skill of the individual inspectors.
Recommendation i_8." A program to
select and train new inspectors should
be instituted to ensure the availability of
an adequate cadre of qualified
inspectors throughout the life of the
Orbiters. In addition, further effort
should be applied to the development of
a quantitative inspection technique.
Finding #9: The Space Shuttle Program
requires both turnaround and periodic
major Orbiter overhaul functions.
Recommendation ¢¢9: Overhaul and
major modification efforts should be
organizationally and functionally
separated from routine turnaround
operations because of the different types
of planning and management skills and
experience required.
Finding #10." The Space Shuttle design
presently includes an automatic
approach guidance system that requires
crew participation and does not control
all landing functions through touchdown
and rollout to wheel stop. The present
system never has been flight testedto
touchdown, but a detailed test objective
for such a test is in preparation. The
availability of a certified automatic
landing system would provide risk
reduction benefits in situations such as
weather problems after de-orbit and
Orbiter windshield damage.
Recommendation #10: Future mission
plans suggest the potential for
significant risk reduction if the present
Space Shuttle automatic landing
capabilities are fully developed and
certified for operational use. System
development should include
consideration of hardware, software, and
human factors issues.
Finding _pll: NASA continued its
software independent verification and
validation (IV&V) activities during the
year. This independent review has
demonstrated its value by finding failure
modes that previously were unknown.
The Safety and Mission Quality
organization has taken on greater
responsibilities for software safety.
Recommendatio_ #11: NASA should
continue to support a software IV&V
oversight activity. The present process
should be reviewed to ascertain whether
it can be streamlined. The IV&V
oversight activity should include the
development of detailed procedures for
test generation. NASA should not
attempt to duplicate, through IV&V or
otherwise, the actual performance of all
verification and validation tests.
Finding _12: The new Space Shuttle
general purpose computer (GPC)
apparently has performed well. The
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) were no
more numerous than expected. Based
upon NASA's model of SEUs, the
accuracy of the predictions is excellent,
and supports NASA_s estimate that the
probability of an SEU-induced failure is
negligibly small. Nevertheless, there
still is concern about the eventual
saturation of usable memory on the
GPC.
Recommendation #12: NASA should
initiate a small study on alternatives for
future GPC upgrades and/or
replacements. This should involve other
NASA organizations that have been
studying computer evolution.
Finding #13: The replacement of some
requested software upgrades with crew
procedures is a matter of serious
concern particularly when the functions
addressed could be handled with greater
reliability and safety by software. The
crew already has to cope with a very
large number of procedures.
Recommendation _13" NASA should
conduct a thorough review of all crew
procedures that might be performed by
the computer system to determine
whether they are better done manually
by the crew or by the software. Human
factors specialists and astronauts should
participate.
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Recommendation #16: Restore these
important safety-related programs.
Finding #14: There are currently a
sufficient number of flightworthy engines
to provide each Orbiter with a flight set
as well as provide an adequate number
of spares.
Recommendation _14: Maintain this
position.
Finding #15: The SSME component
reliability and safety improvement
program, designed to enhance or sustain
the current component operating
margins, has made progress towards
achieving its objectives. The high-
pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) has
completed its certification. Changes to
the two-duct powerhead have eliminated
injector erosion, but more work is
needed to reduce main combustion
chamber (MCC) wall damage. The
process for producing the single-tube
heat exchanger has been developed, and
heat exchangers are being installed for
testing. The high-pressure oxygen
turbopump (HPOTP) changes were less
successful in meeting service-life
objectives, but an operational
workaround to reduce turnaround time
for the HPOTP has been implemented.
Findinz #17: The Alternate Turbopump
v
Program has made major progress
toward achieving its objectives despite
design problems uncovered during
design verification systems (DVS) and
component development tests. Engine-
level tests have begun for both
turbopumps. The value of heavily
instrumented test items run on the E-8
component test stand has been
demonstrated clearly, as evidenced by
the rapid identification of problem
sources and the development of design
changes to overcome them. NASA has
opted to delete the work on the
alternate HPFTP and to continue only
the development on the alternate
HPOTP with the intent to use it, when
certified, in conjunction with the current
HPFTP. While such a configuration is
feasible, such usage will not achieve the
increase of operating margins in the
engine system to the levels desired and
advocated by program and propulsion
specialists.
Recommendation _17: Restore the
alternate HPFTP development.
Recommendation _l& Continue the
development of these reliability and
safety improvements. Complete their
certification as expeditiously as possible.
Finding #16: The development of the
large throat main combustion chamber
(LTMCC) and Advanced Fabrication
Processes for the SSME have been
discontinued. Both of these efforts
eventually would have led to
significantly enhanced safety and
reliability of the SSME.
Finding #1& NASA previously has
investigated the possibility of developing
a new, low-temperature elastomeric
O-ring material to eliminate the need
for the field joint heater assembly on
the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
(RSRM). None was found that was
compatible with the grease used during
assembly. The material (GCT Viton)
being developed for the Advanced Solid
Rocket Motor (ASRM) O-rings has
proper elasticity down to 33*E
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Recommendation ¢?l& NASA should
evaluate the ASRM O-ring material
(GCT Viton) for use on the RSRM to
eliminate the field joint heaters and
their installation.
Findine #19: The full-scale ASRM
propellant manufacturing facility may
not be directly scaleable from the
continuous mix pilot plant. Particular
problem areas relate to the particle size
of the propellant and the screw pump
section of the rotofeed.
Recommendation #19: Scale-up of the
ASRM propellant manufacturing plant
should be scrutinized closely by NASA
to ensure that safety and schedule are
not compromised.
Finding #20: An ambitious automated
process is planned for the ASRM
propellant mixing and casting. This
process will be largely computer-
operated with human operators serving
primarily as initiators and monitors.
This will place significant demands on
the design of the operator interface of
the system to ensure an effective and
safe allocation of tasks and
responsibilities between humans and
computers.
Recommendation ¢t20." The ASRM
program should develop task and
functional analyses of the human
operator's role in the solid rocket
manufacturing process and the operator
interface with the computer system with
emphasis on safety aspects.
techniques and automated internal
stripwinding of the insulation are part of
the design.
Recommendation #21: Due to the
extensive use of new materials and
processes in ASRM case manufacturing,
NASA should monitor the associated
development test program carefully to
ensure that safety is not compromised.
Finding #22: NASA has decided not to
improve the current aft skirt design to
meet the original design specification of
a factor of safety of 1.4. NASA now
believes that a 1.28 factor of safety is
adequate because the loads are well-
defined.
Recommendation ¢_22: Due to the lower
factor of safety on the current RSRM
skirts and the planned use of the same
skirt on future ASRMs, NASA should
task its safety organization to monitor
the loads/strains measured during
launches to establish a truly credible
data base for the statistical justification
of the lower factor of safety.
Finding _23: Logistics development for
the ASRM is being pursued. All related
major contractors and NASA groups are
actively participating. Planning
documents for support equipment,
training, and transporting the motor
elements are being prepared.
Recommendation _23: Continue the
early and thorough consideration of
ASRM logistics issues.
Finding #21: Development of the
ASRM case and its manufacturing
processes includes a number of new
methods and materials. For example, a
new steel case material with associated
plasma-arc welding and repair
_UNCHI_D:J:_NDiNG
:::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::L::5::: : :::::: ::::::::::::::::::5::::':::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Finding #24: Several landing anomalies
were experienced during the past year,
including an extremely short landing on
STS-37. Careful examination of the
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causes of these anomalies led to
significant operational improvements.
Recommendation ¢p24: A continuing
analysis of landing performance should
be undertaken to include hardware,
software, personnel functions, and
information transfer. Continued
improvement in all areas related to
landing safety, including use of wind
data and automatic guidance, should be
sought as part of the movement to shift
more landings to the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC).
Finding #25: In spite of significant
advances over the past year, there is still
a need to improve the effectiveness of
launch processing at KSC. It is rare
when a vehicle is taken to the pad and
launched without delays. Subsystem
problems sometimes either require
rolling the vehicle back to the Vehicle
Assembly Building (VAB) or they cause
delays at the pad.
Recommendation _25: Continue efforts
to improve the effectiveness of launch
processing operations. Each occurrence
of a problem at the pad should be
reviewed to determine why it was not
caught in the VAB or Orbiter
Processing Facility.
Finding #26: Morale among launch
processing personnel at KSC improved
over the past year. This most likely is
the result of a heightened sense of
individual responsibility, improved
systems training, and a better
supervisory/management approach.
Recommendation 1f26: Continue and
expand the approaches that have been
successful over the past year.
Finding #27: Operations and
maintenance instructions (OMIs) have
shown improvement. However, recent
over-pressurization of a solid rocket
booster (SRB) hydraulic tank has been
attributed to an improperly written
OMI. It also has been noted that an
apparent excess of signatures still is
needed in the paperwork generation and
revision process.
Recommendation _27: Effort should
be continued to improve the quality of
OMIs. This should include the
generation, review, and revision of the
instructions. Efforts also should be
made to reduce unnecessary signature
requirements and consolidate paperwork
systems.
Finding #28: The use of task teams at
KSC appears to be working well.
Recommendation ¢p28: The task team
approach should be expanded as
planned. In addition, coordination
among task teams should be improved.
Finding #29: Procedures for tracking,
analyzing, and providing corrective
action for hardware problems arising at
KSC are complex and lengthy involving
numerous entities. There is no overall
coordination effort to ensure that
appropriate corrective action is taken.
Recommendation #29: The Space
Shuttle Program should establish a
coordinating function that is responsible
for ensuring that proper and timely
action is taken by responsible
organizations in correcting problems
that occur during launch preparation.
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Finding #30: The Shuttle Processing
Data Management System II (SPDMS
II) has not yet provided many of its
anticipated benefits. This may be
because prospective users have not been
fully involved in its design. Various
temporary subsystems have emerged and
are being used. However, these may be
difficult to integrate into the final
design.
Recommendation _30: Designers of the
SPDMS II system should directly involve
users in the system's design and
implementation. In particular, care
should be exercised to ensure that the
various subsystems now being used
successfully are included in the final
design.
LOG!STICS :iAN0! iI!S F0 
Finding #31: The Orbiter logistics and
support program appears to be
exhibiting a steady trend of
improvement. The component overhaul
and repair facility has been enhanced,
and personnel skills have been
upgraded. This has improved the
control of such issues as cannibalization,
serviceable component spares levels, and
replenishment of spares stocks.
However, support of Orbiter OV-105
(Endeavour) has caused extra effort in
the latter months of the year and
undoubtedly will continue to do so in
1992.
Recommendation It31: This excellent
program should be continued with
particular attention on the possible
impacts of servicing OV-105.
Finding _32: Coordination among
NASA Centers and contractors on
logistics and support is excellent. This
is due in large part to the activities of
the Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP),
which meets at various locations at
approximately 4-month intervals.
Recommendation ¢t32: NASA should
continue to support the excellent work
being performed by the ILP.
Finding #33: Transfer of critical
management skills and authority to the
NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD)
and to KSC under the Logistics
Management Responsibility Transfer
(LMRT) Program is continuing.
However, in some instances, funding
limitations are slowing the process.
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA)
documents that establish details of
transfer arrangements between such
Centers as the Johnson Space Center
(JSC), Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC), and KSC are being revised or
finalized.
Recommendation #33: It is important
that the centralization of authority and
equipment at KSC continues as planned
under the LMRT concept.
Finding #34: NSLD is consolidating its
activities at Cocoa Beach and is having
a positive effect upon the critical issue
of repair turn-around time (RTAT) for
line replaceable units (LRUs). It
provides protection against threats of
unavailability of repaired or overhauled
units in many cases in which the original
manufacturers are no longer providing
support. RTAT data support the
importance of the proximity of the
NSLD facilities to KSC.
Recommendation #34: The NSLD is
essential to the efficient support of the
Space Shuttle fleet and should continue
to be supported at its current level.
14
Finding lt_35: Cannibalization (or the
removal of working components from an
Orbiter to meet shortages in another
vehicle) has been the subject of much
management attention. With a few
persistent exceptions such as auxiliary
power units (APUs), cannibalization
rates now have been reduced to a
commendably low level.
Recommendation _35: Maintain rigid
controls on cannibalization. This will be
particularly important to accommodate
the absorption of OV-105 into the
operating fleet next year.
Findinz #36: The reduction of
v
component RTAT has been subjected to
as much management scrutiny as
cannibalization and has, perhaps, an
even greater economic and support
effect upon Orbiter capability.
Recommendation _36: There can be no
relaxation of the vigilance entailed in
the pursuit of this cost-sensitive
problem. Therefore, continue to keep
the tightest control over the RTAT
problem.
Finding _37: The problem of stock
inventory held at or below minimum
established levels is becoming critical.
This is largely due to introduction of
OV-105 and to major modification
programs to other Orbiters.
Recommendation ¢_37: Establish
stocking recovery programs as soon as
possible.
Finding #38." The problem of providing
replacements or substitutes for parts or
components that are now out of
production will inevitably worsen with
each passing year. In many cases,
original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) are unwilling or unable to
regenerate small batch production.
Recommendation _38." It is essential to
try to anticipate potential shortages
before they impact the program.
Although this problem currently is being
addressed by NASA, increased
management pressure is needed to avoid
a potential launch rate problem in the
future.
15
C. AERONAUTICS
Finding #39: The Panel was pleased to
note the promulgation on August 12,
1991, of NASA Management Instruction
(NMI) 7900.2 on aircraft operations
management. This NMI and a
companion delineation of aviation safety
requirements in the basic safety manual
are needed steps in the establishment of
a total safety management organization
and Agency-wide philosophy of aviation
safety for administrative aviation.
Recommendation #39: Incorporate
aviation safety requirements in the basic
safety manual as soon as possible to
ensure that NASA personnel have a
common reference for administrative
aviation safety requirements.
Completion of a Headquarters
organization to coordinate flight policies
throughout NASA is needed.
Finding #40: Management of NASA?s
aeronautical flight research continues to
place strong emphasis on flight safety.
Procedures for review and approval of
the flight programs [from project
conception through Flight Readiness
Reviews (FRRs)] are adequate to
ensure full awareness of the major
safety issues involved in each project.
Recommendation f40: NASA's
aeronautical flight research should
continue to be given strong support at
appropriate levels to maintain a safe
program for preserving the nation's
dominance in the aeronautical sciences.
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D. OTHER
Finding #41: Crew members working
on the Space Shuttle for extended
periods have experienced difficulties
achieving sufficient sleep. This problem
is magnified when two shift operations
are conducted. These problems are
similar to those experienced by aircraft
flight crews in long-haul operations.
Recommendation ¢?41: NASA should
support a program of research and
countermeasure development on crew
rest cycles and circadian rhythm shifting
to support both Space Shuttle and Space
Station operations. This program could
be modeled productively after the
ongoing NASA aircrew research.
Finding ¢?42: Despite acknowledged
examples of contributions to aviation
safety analyses through human factors
research, NASA has not marshalled its
resources in this field to study similar
problems in spaceflight orbital and
ground operations. Efforts in this arena
have been stymied by a lack of
appreciation of its potential value and
the absence of clear guidelines
regarding programmatic responsibilities.
Recommendation #42: In view of the
anticipated increase in manned
spaceflight activity during the present
decade involving joint Space Shuttle and
Space Station activities, NASA_ human
factors resources should be marshalled
and coordinated effectively to address
the problems of risk assessment and
accident avoidance.
Finding #43: NASA has a hierarchy of
reporting systems for mishaps and
incidents that defines investigation
procedures/responsibilities and provides
for developing lessons learned. These
reporting systems function quite well for
relatively serious accidents, incidents,
mishaps, and near-misses. NASA does
not have a system analogous to the
Federal Aviation Agency's (FAA_)
Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) for collecting self-reports of
human errors that do not lead to an
otherwise reportable event.
Recommendation ¢843: NASA should
examine ways to encourage self-reports
of human errors and to analyze and
learn from data and trends in these
reports. Inclusion of coverage of the
need for human-error reporting in task
team training with an associated method
for analyzing the reports could prove to
be an excellent method for collecting
this information.
Finding #44: The Tethered Satellite
System (TSS) program was plagued by
two quality control problems during the
year. One problem was a failure of the
bonding between the rotor of the
vernier motor and the cork clutch
material. The other problem was
associated with an error in identifying
heat treating requirements for 15-5
stainless steel. Installed components
using this steel that was not heat treated
should require a waiver before clearance
to fly is granted. Failure of 15-5 steel
pins in the concentric damper negator
motor or tower tabs could potentially
impact safety.
Recommendation #44: A complete
review of the TSS quality assurance
program should be conducted before
flight in addition to the already initiated
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examination of the suitability of the
suspectparts.
Finding #45: Existing plans for Space
Shuttle missions such as the Hubble
Space Telescope (HST) repair, and the
assembly and maintenance of the
downsized SSF, highlight potential
benefits from the use of an improved
spacesuit and extravehicular mobility
unit (EMU) to replace the existing suit
and portable life support system (PLSS).
Limitations inherent in the design of the
present system could pose operational
for safety problems on these and future
missions. The AX-5 and Mark 3
research and development programs
have provided an excellent basis for
implementing a new, improved design
for extravehicular activity (EVA)
equipment. Compatibility of the new
suit designs with the existing PLSS
potentially provides a cost-effective
upgrade path.
Recommendation #45: NASA should
reconsider the specification and
development of a new suit and EMU
based on the information developed in
the AX-5 and Mark 3 programs. NASA
should acknowledge the need for a new
suit and EMU as soon as possible and
establish its development and
implementation schedule consistent with
budget availability. Use of a new suit
with the existing PLSS specifically
should be examined as an interim safety
improvement step.
Finding ¢746: Determinants of the risk
of bends during EVA activities have not
been fully researched. Existing
prebreathing protocols are based on
ground-based pressure chamber tests
and scuba diving tables. A significant
safety uncertainty could be removed if
the specific effects of micro-gravity EVA
conditions on nitrogen bubble formation
were determined and documented.
Recommendation #46: NASA should
support the research necessary to
characterize more fully the bends risk
associated with micro-gravity EVA
activities using its extensive expertise at
the research centers and the data
collection opportunities available during
on-ground simulations and Space Shuttle
flights.
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III
INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION FREEDOM PROGRAM
Ref: Findings #1 through #3
Space Station Freedom (SSF) has
undergone a major restructuring.
Difficult issues in program content and
operations have been realistically
confronted. Nevertheless, SSF remains
a very complex program involving three
NASA development Centers, three
international partners, a significant
ground integration, and launch
responsibility for the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) and numerous
development and support contractors.
Figure 1 depicts the overall program
plan and organizational responsibilities.
An outline of the administration of
program policy and direction is shown in
Figure 2.
Geographically dispersed locations and
fragmented levels of responsibility have
contributed to management complexity,
especially in the systems engineering
and integration area. Management has
attempted to mitigate this situation by
combining the systems engineering and
systems integration responsibilities into
a single office at Reston, Virginia (Level
II) and delegating specific
implementation authority to the field
centers as outlined in Figure 3. The
field managers, in administering their
responsibilities as Level II staff, have at
their disposal the technical and
administrative resources of their Centers
as well as staff members specifically
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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assigned to that office. At the same
time, they are close to the Level III
activity at the Centers where the
development responsibility resides. The
activity at the Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) shown in Figure 4 is an
illustration of this arrangement.
The Elements Integration Office
Manager at MSFC (Level II) reports
programmatically to the Manager,
System Engineering and Integration
Office (Level II) located in Reston,
Virginia, and attends Level II meetings
and briefings with managers from other
Centers. The manager's relationship
with the Space Station Projects Office
(SSPO) at MSFC (Level III) remains a
typical Level II/III interface. The
advantage of the arrangement is in the
personnel allocations. The Elements
Integration Office Manager has a staff
of 13 people supported by Grumman,
the Space Station Engineering and
Integration Contractor (SSEIC), which
has approximately 80 staff members
assigned to the MSFC Element
Integration Office. In addition, as a
consequence of being located at MSFC,
the manager also can enlist a full range
of specialists from the Science and
Engineering Directorate as needed.
Similar arrangements exist at other
Centers.
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Changes also have been effected in
Level II activity at Reston. The new
management structure is in place and
has established clear responsibility
among the various organizations and
program levels. Grumman, SSEIC to
NASA Level II at Reston, is now
undertaking a realistic integration role
in addition to the supporting function it
has been serving. Communications
between NASA and SSEIC have
improved greatly. For instance, SSEIC
personnel now attend the SSF meetings
of key NASA integration managers from
which they previously were excluded.
The SSF design changes have had some
impacts on safety and risk. For
example, use of a preintegrated truss
(PIT) structure (see below) greatly
should reduce risks associated with the
extensive extravehicular activities
(EVAs) required by erection of the
previous design. On the other hand, the
elimination of two nodes reduces the
available egress paths and, hence, likely
increases risk. Overall, it appears that
the program has struck a reasonable
balance between reduced cost and
complexity and the acceptance of an
appropriate level of risk.
Ultimately, the operational risks
associated with SSF will depend to a
great extent on the availability and type
of emergency assured crew return
capability. The issue of providing such
a capability from SSF continues to
challenge NASA. There are several
options under study including the
development of a dedicated "lifeboat"
and utilizing the Space Shuttle. Other
factors that may influence selection of a
final design include the possible use of
an expendable launch vehicle and
associated personnel carrier that could
be utilized as a return vehicle. Studies
of these various alternatives are only
partially complete. Current information
appears to be insufficient to select a
preferred approach.
Ref: Finding #4
The use of truss segments, which are
preintegrated with distributed systems
and verified on the ground instead of
erected on-orbit, has reduced technical
risk and made the Space Station a more
viable program. The preintegrated truss
members (PIT) must be heavier than
the original truss elements per running
foot because the entire mass of the PIT
is subjected to launch loads.
PIT members are aluminum I-beams
bolted together instead of the more
flexible graphite composite elements
that previously were part of the design.
The heavier construction allows Orbit
Replaceable Units (ORUs) to be
located in their optimum positions for
accessibility.
Table 1 compares several features of the
restructured and original SSF designs.
One benefit of the restructured design is
that EVA time has been reduced
considerably so that EVA targets are
now feasible. This has been
accomplished by reducing the demand
for EVAs and increasing the efficiency
of those that must be performed.
Examples of changes that positively
impact EVA in addition to the use of
the PIT are:
Providing tools and equipment
for independent and/or parallel
EVA operations
Enhancing the utility of EVA
support equipment
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TABLE 1
SSF Assembly and Operational Capability
Preintegrated Erectable
(After Jan. 91) (Before Jun. 90)
Truss 315 ft. 479 ft.
Sections/Bays 7 Sect. 29 bays
Assembly
Elements 17 122
Lab/Hab
Modules 27 ft. 44 ft.
Nodes 2 4
Cupola 1 2
All International
Elements Yes Yes
Assembly
Flights 16 18
Man-Crews 4 8
KW-Power 56.25 75
Locating ORUs to simplify EVA
operations
Simplifying the Mobile
Transporter.
In the assembly of the PIT sections on-
orbit, a capture latch provides final
alignment by engaging guide pins after
the sections are brought into proximity
by the Space Shuttle remote
manipulator arm. Motorized bolts then
make the final latch-up. There is a
chance that these sections may not line
up correctly; therefore, damage may
occur to the guide pins and bolts when
the motorized bolts engage. Because
the PIT sections will be assembled on
the ground, the opportunity exists to test
the alignment and mating procedures
prior to flight.
The SSF restructuring has eliminated
some risks and hazards inherent in the
previous design, but has introduced the
following new ones:
The provision of only one airlock
instead of two. Loss of node #2,
which contains this airlock, would
severely hamper EVA activities.
A totally "open race track"
making it impossible to have dual
egress paths.
The reduction of the atmospheric
pressure to 10.2 psia, which
increases fire risk due to the
increased partial pressure of
oxygen.
Although the hazards analyses are
proceeding well, many potentially
serious items still are contained on the
critical item lists. These should be
reduced or eliminated as the design
process progresses.
Ref: Finding #5
The basic architecture and functions of
the data management system (DMS)
have not changed significantly with the
most recent restructuring of the SSF
design. Originally, the DMS
components exceeded their power
allocations. The current DMS design
almost meets its weight, power, and
volume allocations.
Although the DMS hardware design
seems to be proceeding as planned, the
software is still a great challenge; it is
one of the pacing items of the program.
To meet the present delta design review
(DDR) schedule, 17 DDRs will have to
be accomplished in 1992. This may not
be possible unless software development
keeps pace.
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B. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
ORBITER
Ref: Finding #6
Photoanalysis of the STS-28 (OV-102,
Columbia) flight showed larger body
flap deflections than were calculated.
The flaps are in a turbulent flow field,
which creates a hinge moment spectrum
greater than that used in the structural
fatigue analysis. The loads are all
within the structural limits, but the
fatigue analysis shows a reduction of
allowable flights from 100 to 77.
After the higher hinge moments were
observed, additional ground tests were
conducted using recalibrated strain
gages on the body flap actuator as well
as additional instrumentation on the
rotors and stators. Three types of loads
were applied. It was discovered that an
additional load path existed back
through the driving gear to the
supporting structure. The original
equations assumed only four load paths
at the actuators. With a fifth load path,
it is necessary to develop a new set of
equations. It also was discovered that
the actuators were more flexible than
originally assumed and that the OV-102
(Columbia) actuators were more flexible
than those on OV-103 (Discovery) and
OV-104 (Atlantis). This is attributable
to increased tooth width on the OV-103
and OV-104 actuators. Additional tests
are planned to further evaluate the body
flap structure.
Ref: Finding #7
To apply traditional inspection
techniques, such as visual and X-ray
methods, disassembly frequently is
required. Therefore, a Shuttle Modal
Inspection System (SMIS) has been
developed to augment more
conventional structural inspection
techniques. Although not a replacement
for conventional inspection processes,
SMIS is capable of finding some defects
without the need to disassemble the
system being tested.
SMIS uses changes in structural
dynamics characteristics to detect
problems such as wear of actuators,
honeycomb debond and cracks in
primary structure that are large enough
to change stiffness. Actual modal tests
experienced on OV-102 and OV-103
have proven the benefits of this system
to detect structural damage. To apply
SMIS, each Orbiter part must be tested
to establish baseline modal information
to serve as a standard to determine if
structural changes have occurred.
Currently, it is planned to use SMIS on
a regular basis for data acquisition and
analysis of Orbiter body flaps after
every fifth flight.
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Ref" Finding #8
In the past, tile bonding process controls
and bond verification testing were used
to ensure the integrity of the thermal
protection system and identify
substandard bonds. Approximately
20,000 to 27,000 tiles were tested on
each individual vehicle. Typically, only
13 to 64 tile bond failures were found.
Initial checkout of OV-105 (Endeavour)
has shown only 13 failures.
Use of such bond verification testing has
been discontinued because it was
determined that tactile and visual
inspection techniques by specially
trained and experienced inspectors
provided adequate results. These
"Wiggly" tests depend on the sensitivity
of the inspector's touch to determine if
tiles are loose. The inspectors also
examine and measure step and gap
dimensions. Such tile inspections are
conducted before each flight.
Tile inspection clearly is dependent on
the availability of skilled inspectors.
New quantitative methods could be
devised to reduce the dependency on
qualitative human inspections. These
likely will take some time to develop.
Therefore, new inspectors must be
trained well in advance of their need to
support the Orbiter flow.
Ref: Finding #9
The Space Shuttle Program has
commenced its first major Orbiter
overhaul cycle with work on OV-102
(Columbia) at the Rockwell Palmdale
facility. Future overhauls and major
modifications on the other Orbiters
presently are scheduled to take place at
KSC. With aircraft systems, line
maintenance and overhaul or major
modification functions are typically
organizationally separated even when
they are conducted at the same location.
This has worked well with aircraft and is
likely a good model for the Space
Shuttle Program to follow. Simply,
different types of planning, management
skills, and experience are required by
routine turnaround flow and the more
major overhaul and modification
operations.
Ref: Finding #10
The Space Shuttle system presently
includes an autoland system that
provides automated guidance capable of
navigating the Orbiter to the selected
landing runway. Automated approach
guidance requires the availability of a
well-calibrated microwave scanning
beam landing system. Completion of a
successful landing requires the crew to
manually deploy the air data probes and
landing gear by activating cockpit
switches. This is similar to the situation
with commercial aircraft. The crew also
must be active in the post-touchdown
rollout phase to ensure a safe transition
to wheel stop because no automatic
braking is provided. The present system
is viewed by the Space Shuttle Program
as an emergency backup to the
commander and pilot, but there are no
documented decision rules for its use or
operational scenarios under which it is
mandated. It has not been tested all
the way to touchdown during an actual
flight. However, a detailed test
objective (DTO) is being developed by
the Space Shuttle Program to provide
for at least one full automatic landing.
The increased duration of Space Shuttle
flights as part of the Extended Duration
Orbiter Program (EDO) has raised the
issue of the need to qualify the existing
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system during actual flights. It also
raises the issue of the possible need to
fully automate all landing, rollout, and
braking functions so that the Orbiter
could be returned safely from orbit
without any crew intervention, if
necessary.
Before discussing the need for possible
enhancements to the present capability,
the status of the present subsystem must
be reviewed. The existing subsystem is
designed to provide guidance
information to the Orbiter through all of
the descent flight phases:
Entry guidance (500,000 feet to
Mach 2.5)
Terminal Area Energy
Management (TAEM) (Mach 2.5
to 10,000 feet)
Approach and landing (10,000
feet to touchdown).
Although the crew must deploy the air
data probes and landing gear, there is
an automatic speed brake deployment
and positioning that occurs independent
of the guidance system. This is similar
to the prevailing autoland systems in
commercial airliners.
The Space Shuttle system differs from
those in airliners because it defaults to
automatic mode when deorbit
commences, and remains there unless
the crew switches to the control stick
steering (CSS) mode (manual flying).
The switch to CSS can be accomplished
through a pushbutton on the instrument
panel or, on an axis-by-axis basis, by
moving the control stick. This is known
as "Hot Stick" downmoding to CSS.
The TAEM phase is of particular
interest because it determines the
energy state and runway alignment of
the vehicle at a time in the descent
when correction for low or high energy
states is possible. TAEM usually is
flown manually by the crew, although
guidance can adequately control the
vehicle around the heading alignment
cone and on to touchdown. When the
crew flies manually, they tend to
manage energy somewhat less
aggressively than would the
programming of the present automatic
system. This increases crew comfort
and reduces loads on the Orbiter.
Effort presently is being devoted to
examining a change in the guidance
system to emulate more closely the
trajectories actually flown by the crews.
The existing automated approach
guidance system never has been fully
flight tested. The second Space Shuttle
flight, STS-2, left the auto mode
engaged until the latter part of the
TAEM region and demonstrated that
the system was capable of returning the
vehicle to a flyable energy state from a
low energy state. STS-3 left the system
in auto until the commander's scheduled
takeover at 125 feet. The system was
on energy and trajectory at takeover,
but the pilot had difficulty getting "into
the loop," and an uncomfortable
situation developed. The final several
thousand feet of a Shuttle's descent
involves relatively complex flare
maneuvers with which a pilot might be
expected to have difficulty when
retaking command.
A DTO for remaining totally in the
automatic mode to touchdown was
scheduled for STS-16 (41F). However,
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when STS-15 (41D) had an engine-out
pad abort, flights were remanifested and
the DTO was canceled and never
rescheduled. As a result, although there
have been numerous Simulation runs,
computer modeling, and post-flight
analyses of guidance commands, there
never hasbeen a flight demonstration of
the auto guidance capability all the way
to touchdown. Therefore, the cognizant
contractor would not certify the system
becauseof the absenceof a flight test.
Rockwell is undertaking a reverification
of automatic entry and autoland as part
of their funding for the EDO missions.
However, this does not mean that it has
been determined that autoland will be
needed for EDO or that a decision to
use it has been made. Plans are being
formulated for an autoland DTO to be
executed within the next year. This will
begin the processof in-flight verification
of the system. Future analyses are
planned to determine if additional flight
tests will be required to develop an
operationally certified system.
The existing automatic approach
guidance capability represents a
sufficient foundation of hardware and
software to support the contemplated
DTO. Eventually, a fully certified
system may require certain
enhancements such as increased
redundancy, decision rules for leaving
the automatic mode engaged, and
automated gear and air data probe
deployment.
There are four basic situations under
which Space Shuttle flight safety would
be enhanced by the use of some degree
of automated landing assistance. These
are:
Crew unavailability. This is a
situation in which the crew cannot
perform their piloting functions
adequately because of external
conditions. For example, a
situation of unavailability might
occur if the windscreen of the
Orbiter became completely
obscured or the cockpit filled with
smoke or fumes making it
impossible for the crew to guide
the craft visually.
Obvious crew incapacitation. The
crew may become physically or
mentally incapacitated in a manner
that allows them or ground
controllers to detect the
incapacitation. Such obvious
incapacitation might range from
total loss of consciousness to loss
of visual accommodation or the
ability to move.
Subtle crew incapacitation. The
crew may become physically or
mentally incapable of flying the
Orbiter in such a manner that both
they and the ground controllers
continue to believe that they, in
fact, are in control. Subtle
incapacitations have been
experienced in many high stress
environments. They typically
involve phenomena in which the
human sensory and/or cognitive
mechanisms are misleading.
Examples might involve impaired
depth perception, spatial
orientation, or eye-hand
coordination.
Capability Limitations. There are
flight situations, particularly
abort maneuvers, that stress crew
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capabilities to the limits. This stressmay
be particularly acute if a landing is
required into a relatively unfamiliar field.
For situations involving capability
limitations, computer assistancethrough
an autoland system can augment or
replace the human crew. This has the
added benefit of permitting the crew to
undertake other critical tasks besides
the landing guidance and management
of the Orbiter. The generally quicker
responsetime of a computerized system
as well as its ability to store and recall
vast quantities of contingency
information make a standby autoland
system a valuable resource.
In the event of crew unavailability or
incapacitation, the crew may retain
some limited functional capability. For
example, they may be able to activate
switches to deploy air data probes and
landing gear. Under these
circumstances, an automatic landing
system that required minimal crew
interventions, suchas switch activations,
likely would represent adequate support.
Alternatively, the crew may be totally
incapable of participating in the landing
operation due to unconsciousness or the
inability to move or function. In this
case, a fully autonomous autoland
capability would be required to ensure
the safe return of the Space Shuttle.
This system might need the capability of
remote activation to account for
situations in which the crew becomes
totally incapacitated after downmoding
to manual (CSS) steering.
The situation of subtle incapacitation
raises additional salient issues. If the
crew is unaware that their performance
is degraded, it is illogical to expect them
to decide to execute an automated
approach. This suggests the need for
objectively defined operational rules for
the use of automated guidance. For
example, a rule might require the use of
autoland for all missions exceeding a
specified length (e.g., 10 days). The
system also should include specific
decision rules for engaging the
automatic mode (or leaving it engaged)
during flights not covered by the
operational rules. It also would be
beneficial to research possible crew
performance measures that could be
used during flight to assess the need for
an automatic landing. Such measures
could be examined during actual Space
Shuttle landings by collecting data from
secondary tasks performed by nonflying
members of the crew.
The reluctance of the crews to give up
their manual landing opportunities as
well as their concern about the
"takeover" problems based on the STS-3
experience is understandable. However,
it would seem that a takeover at such a
low altitude would be highly unusual
and might not be sufficiently credible to
include in the certification criteria.
The basic flight controls and computers
are in use and have been shown to be
reliable during Space Shuttle missions.
However, additional sensors and inputs
may have to be employed for a full
feature and safe "nonpilot participating"
autolanding. This may call for a safety
review of the extended system.
With commercial airplanes, the overall
safety level of the total system, airborne
and ground, is checked carefully by a
comprehensive failure mode and effect
analysis (FMEA) to ensure that the
whole system will meet a prescribed
safety level. This analysis is conducted
independent of any consideration of
pilot intervention. A significant factor
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of the FMEA in commercial aircraft
probability analysis is the evaluation of
fault-free performance. That is, out-of-
tolerance performance not due to a
detectable fault that could lead to an
incident, possibly an accident, must be
considered when arriving at the overall
predicted safety level.
In commercial aircraft, autopilots used
for approach/landing are designed to
have various redundancy levels
depending upon their operational use.
A fail passive or fail-benign system is
used for operation down to 100 feet. If
a fault occurs, the autopilot will
automatically disconnect and warn the
pilot, but not disturb the flight path.
Airplanes conducting such landings in
low visibility using fail passive systems
generally are certified for use in
approaches to low altitude (e.g., 100 feet
or so). This is provided it can be shown
that the pilot can take over and conduct
a landing or go-around safely. If the
automatic pilot is to be used down to
touchdown without pilot intervention,
such as a go-around or path correction,
a fail operational system of some form
is required and a very low probability of
a failure that could lead to a loss of
control must be established before the
system can be certified. The probability
of a safe go-around can mitigate this
value somewhat. Obviously, this is not
the case with the Space Shuttle.
Without considering pilot intervention,
the Space Shuttle system will need to
land with an extremely high probability
of being within prescribed parameters of
touchdown vertical velocity limits,
lateral and longitudinal dispersions, and
any other limits peculiar to the
Space Shuttle such as body angle. The
confirmation of the possibility of a
malfunction or fault-free performance
outside limits would need to be shown
to be extremely improbable. Therefore,
a Space Shuttle autoland system would
need to provide full fail-operational
performance through touchdown and
rollout.
Another vital aspect of autoland
certification is to ensure that the landing
parameters, flare profile, decrab
maneuver, transition to rollout, etc.,
conform to what a reasonable pilot
would tolerate. In the early days of
commercial autolanding, these profiles
were determined by software engineers.
Although they achieved the accuracies
required, they were unnatural and
unacceptable to the pilots, thus causing
a potential and possibly dangerous pilot
intervention to occur.
Today, the flight profiles flown by
commercial autoland systems have been
refined to be so natural and consistent
that most airline pilots say "the system
does a better job than I do." If NASA
embarks upon a program to develop
natural landing maneuvers by the
automatics that are pilot acceptable, it
also will have the distinct advantage that
pilots will be more likely to use the
system, even when it is not mandated.
Thus, this will provide valuable
operational experience and data and, in
the end, a higher safety level.
On the assumption that operation solely
by the human pilot as the prime safety
element may not be viable under certain
operational circumstances, a fully
automatic landing system becomes
essential to the safe completion of a
Space Shuttle mission.
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Ref. Findings #11 through #13
During the year, NASA continued its
independent review of the verification
and validation process related to Space
Shuttle software. This independent
review has demonstrated its value by
finding failure modes that previously
were unknown. Increased involvement
of the Office of Safety and Mission
Quality with software safety also was a
positive step.
Software verification and validation can
take several forms including:
Continual oversight and review of
the process
Oversight and review of the
generation of the tests used in
the process
Complete verification and
validation conducted by a totally
independent organization.
Costs and benefits of these approaches
vary considerably. The cost of an
ongoing, independent review of the
verification and validation process and
of the test generation is relatively small
compared to the total cost of the
process. The present ongoing,
independent review has demonstrated
the value of this activity and should be
continued. Although an internal
steering committee on embedded
verification and validation has been
formed, it was not until the independent
contractor became involved that a
"roadmap" of the process and generation
of the tests used was established. The
internal steering committee has not
succeeded in carrying out the necessary
functions on its own.
Now that a complete roadmap for the
verification and validation process is
available, the Panel believes that the
independent contractor should review
the process, end to end, and look for
ways to simplify it. At present, it
involves a great number of machines
and people. In addition, the
independent contractor should
investigate the process by which the
tests for the verification and validation
process are generated. It is essential
that the independent contractor utilize
personnel intimately familiar with
NASA?s software processes. An
independent contractor not utilizing
such personnel would have great
difficulty in adequately carrying out this
function.
Independent performance of the tests,
however, is another matter. Costs
associated with the verification and
validation process are very high. One
unofficial estimate puts the cost as high
as $500,000 for the physical apparatus
alone. Further, the process can only be
reliably performed by personnel
intimately familiar with the software
production process. Therefore, great
care must be taken in any proposed
decision to independently perform the
verification and validation function.
There must be both an acceptance of
the substantial costs involved and a plan
to acquire the experienced personnel
necessary to carry out the work. ASAP
believes that these two factors mitigate
against the third listed alternative,
independent performance of the
verification and validation tests. Simply,
the potential gain does not justify the
cost.
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The new general purpose computer
(GPC) hardware seemsto be performing
well. The single event upsets (SEUs)
were no more numerous than expected.
Indeed, accuracy of the predictions
based upon NASA_smodel of SEUs was
impressive. A cursory analysis concurs
with NASA_s estimate that the
probability of an SEU-induced failure is
negligibly small.
There is still a potential problem arising
from the eventual saturation of usable
memory on the new GPC. While the
time horizon of the "new" GPC hasbeen
extended somewhat by moving some
requested upgrades into procedures and
slowing the software changeprocess,the
conclusion is the same. Long before the
end of its planned lifetime, the "new"
GPC will be saturated and a further
change will be necessary. It is still the
case that any foreseen possibility of
further upgrade will require massive
reverification and revalidation. With
the extension of the time at which this
impasse will occur, NASA has the time,
if it acts promptly, to plan carefully for
this next change and complete it at
minimum cost and turmoil. A small
planning effort on the next generation
computer upgrade should be started as
soon as possible. This study should not
be constrained to living with the current
architecture, and should involve others
in NASA who have been studying long-
term computer evolution for space
applications.
The movement of some requests for
software upgrades to crew procedures is
a matter of serious concern. The crew
already has a very large number of
procedures with which to be familiar.
Adding to that load, particularly with
items that could be handled easily with
greater reliability and safety by software,
does not seem wise. Procedures such as
"do not touch the keyboard for X
seconds after the occurrence of event Y"
can be handled easily by software. If
such procedures are contingencies that
are employed infrequently, the chance
of error when they are needed rises.
A review of all computer-related
procedures to ascertain whether or not
there is significant potential for design-
induced human errors should be
mounted. This review should include
crew representatives, experts on human
factors, and members of the Safety and
Mission Quality organization.
Ref: Findings #14 through #17
The in-flight performance of the Space
Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) has been
very consistent and without significant
anomalies since the return-to-flight after
Challenger. There are now sufficient
engines at KSC to provide four shipsets
for the Orbiters plus three spare
engines. The practice of removing all
three engines from the Orbiter after
each flight and conducting the post- and
pre-flight tests in the "engine room" has
proved beneficial and effective. Except
for the high-pressure turbopumps, the
major components of the engines have
demonstrated service lifetimes in excess
of the specified 55 equivalent Space
Shuttle flights.
The Phase II component improvement
program designed to enhance the safety
and/or reliability of the current engine
components has continued to make
progress. The status of the changes to
the major components is:
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High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
(HPFTP): All changes to this
turbopump have completed the
certification requirements; flight
units are being built. The machine
has demonstrated the requisite
10,000 second run time (20 flights)
and was to have been authorized a
service life of a "green run" on the
test stand plus nine flights (half
certification life). The failure of a
high-time HPFTP turbine blade in
test engine 0215, most probably
the result of a blade material flaw,
has resulted in a reduced "certified
operating time" of 7,000 seconds
(14 flights). This is the equivalent
of a service life of a "green run"
plus six flights. A new Computer
Tomography blade material
inspection technique has been
implemented, which will allow the
restoration of the 10,000 seconds
certification. Pumps with such
blades are being assembled, and
flight use is estimated for the
middle of 1992.
High-Pressure Oxy. gen Turbopump
(HPOTP): As noted in last year's
report, the SSME project decided
to abandon its attempt to certify
the HPOTP for 10,000 seconds of
service life and instead opted to
certify the turbopump so that the
pump-end bearings can be used for
three flights and the turbine-end
bearings used for six flights before
replacement. To accomplish this,
changes to the inducer/inlet,
bearing cage coating, ion
implantation of the bearing balls,
and a material change to the jet
ring to increase its fatigue-life
were incorporated and certified.
Improved on-engine inspection
tools for the turbine-end bearing
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have been developed and are in
service. In-flight strain-gage
measurements of the vibration
signature of the pump-end bearings
to detect early signs of bearing
wear are also a part of this
configuration. Experience to date
with these measurements has been
satisfactory. A number of
HPOTPs have been flown three
times.
Single-tube Heat Exchanger: The
fabrication process for producing
the 41-foot long single tube for the
heat exchanger has been developed
and 10 tubes have been completed.
Two tubes have been coiled, and
mockups and test specimens are
being built. This represents a
major hurdle in this program.
One coil is in the process of being
welded into a powerhead and is to
be tested in mid-1992.
Certification is scheduled for
completion in FY 1993.
Phase lI+ Powerhead: The Phase
II + Powerhead (also known as the
two-duct powerhead) was tested
last year. As noted in last year's
report, both injector erosion and
chamber wall blanching were
experienced. On the positive side,
lateral pressure gradients and
velocity profile nonuniformities
were reduced substantially. Since
then, the flow shields on the
injector posts were modified, and
tests on a second powerhead were
conducted. Injector erosion was
eliminated, but main combustion
chamber (MCC) blanching and
wall damage still were experienced.
This has been attributed to a high
flow resistance coolant circuit in
the specific chamber used. Two
units have been built to continue
development; one with the current
design combustion chamber and
one with the large throat
combustion chamber. Tests have
been conducted with the large
throat main combustion chamber
(LTMCC) unit with very
satisfactory results (the absence of
blanching in these tests is the
result of improved cooling design
in the chamber).
As noted in last year's report, the
LTMCC was tested on engine 0208. In
some 3,700 seconds of testing, including
26 starts, the predicted benefits were
verified. In addition to reductions in
the chamber pressure, turbine
temperatures, and speeds, the hot gas
wall temperature in the chamber was
reduced about 100"F. This will have a
significant effect on the rate of
combustion chamber blanching and
cracking. Analysis indicates that using
the LTMCC would increase the margin-
of-safety of selected engine components
by 12 to 30 percent. The testing noted
above with the Phase II+ Powerhead
has increased the accumulated run time
of the LTMCC to 5,000 seconds.
Unfortunately, the LTMCC development
was tied to the Advanced Fabrication
Project whose results were to be
incorporated no earlier than mid-1997.
Were this not the case, the benefits of
the LTMCC could have been realized
much sooner, as the LTMCC does not
depend on improved fabrication
processes to achieve increased margins.
Because of NASA budget constraints,
funding for both of these efforts was
eliminated for FY 1992. To the
detriment of the program, all activity on
these efforts will come to a halt before
mid-1992.
The design verification system (DVS)
testing (both laboratory and rig tests) of
the components of the Pratt and
Whitney (P&W) Alternate Turbopump
Program (ATP) is substantially complete
including demonstrations of component
life. Some data still are being analyzed,
but results to date look good.
Significantly, the bearing materials and
coatings have been selected and proven.
An acoustic emission probe installed for
the bearing rig tests shows promise of
serving as an in-flight health monitoring
instrument. Spin tests of shafts, disks,
and impellers have verified the burst
margins of these parts. Note that these
test specimens were heavily strain-gaged
so that data could be obtained to verify
the structural analysis models of these
critical components. A few DVS tests
await the build of final configurations.
HPFTP: Testing of the HPFTP
on the P&W E-8 test stand and of
unit 4 on an engine at Stennis
Space Center (SSC) revealed a
number of problems with the
design. Among them were thermal
cracks in the first turbine vane
inner shroud, tip seal displacement
on the third pump impeller, main
pump discharge housing vane
cracking, and turbine inlet housing
strut and slot cracking. Fixes for
these have been devised and are in
work. Some have been
incorporated into unit 5, which has
been run at SSC for reasonably
long times at 100-percent rated
power level (RPL) and has
reached 109-percent for a brief
time. The plan is to have all fixes
incorporated by unit 7.
HPOTP: This turbopump
encountered more difficulties than
its fuel counterpart during
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development testing. Among them
is a synchronous vibration problem
at high power levels when pumping
LO 2. Many changes to the
mechanical design and assembly
details have been incorporated in
an attempt to solve the
rotordynamic problem. This
includes increasing the tiebolt load,
the pump-end ball bearing
deadband, and the damper seal
diameter. So far, the changes that
have been incorporated have
performed well during the E-8 test
of unit 05-1, which ran to 104-
percent RPL with acceptable
vibration characteristics. This unit
has been cleared for 100-percent
RPL operation on an engine.
Heavily instrumented unit 4-1D
was used to verify some additional
improvements. It ran satisfactorily
to l 11-percent RPL with LO 2 on
E-8. Unfortunately, unit 6 (which
incorporated a de-swirler, in
addition to other changes)
exhibited rotordynamic instability
at 109-percent RPL. It is believed
that the cause of this phenomenon
has been identified. Follow-on
units will include additional
changes to attempt to eliminate
this cause.
Integrated Tests: The tests of the
HPFTP on an engine with the
current HPOTP have shown that
the transient characteristics of this
machine generally are compatible
with the rest of the engine system
during start and shutdown. There
are differences, of course, because
of different moment of inertia and
breakaway torque of the new
machine. As a result, some valve
sequencing had to be modified to
reduce the fuel preburner ignition
temperature spike. Some
additional tuning will undoubtedly
be required. Performance of the
HPF'FP, as measured on the
engine, agrees well with the data
obtained in the E-8 tests. Testing
of both the P&W HPFTP and
HPOTP on an engine is scheduled.
In summary, as in most turbopump
development programs, the problems
encountered in the ATP lie in the
(subtle) mechanical details of the
design. Problem causes include details
such as clearances, seals, venting of
volumes enclosed by cover plates, effects
of damping seals and bearing preloads
on rotordynamics, and effects of thermal
transients during startup. The ability to
determine the causes of the problems
encountered has been enhanced greatly
by the use of component test rigs and,
perhaps more importantly, availability of
the E-8 turbopump test stand. Coupled
with good and extensive instrumentation
of the development units, these facilities
allow rapid identification of problems
and permit rational corrective action.
Operation of the E-8 stand has
improved much since last year. It is
reported that two out of three test
attempts now lead to successful runs-
excellent performance for so complex a
facility.
Engine-level tests have revealed some
system issues but, so far, nothing of
major consequence. Schedules are still
optimistic. Significant progress has been
achieved since last year. Engine tests
with both turbopumps installed will be a
major milestone in the near future.
In a recent decision resulting from
budgetary problems, NASA has decided
to cancel work on the P&W HPFTP and
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to continue only the development of the
P&W HPOTP. The plan is to use this
new HPOTP in conjunction with the
current HPFTE While such an engine
configuration is feasible, it will not
achieve the operating margin increases
sought for the engine system. NASA
has made provisions in its planning to
review the status of the P&W HPOTP
development in 1994 and reconsider the
cessation of HPFTP development at that
time.
APU Turbine Wheel Blade Cracks:
Blade root and tip cracks have existed
since the start of the program. The
turbine wheel speed is 72,000 rpm, with
a high speed of 81,000 rpm. A design
revision was initiated in December 1987;
it produced 15 wheels that have
accumulated 210 hours with no cracks.
By the time this report is published, all
APUs will have been equipped with the
new turbine wheels. The new design
wheels are certified for 20 hours with a
75-hour certification test to be
completed in the first quarter of 1992.
APU Gas Generator Valve Module Seat:
The shutoff outlet seat has evidenced
cracks. The investigation of the launch
scrub of STS-31 showed that the seat
was broken and a piece missing. The
consequences could be a reduced APU
output or possibly a shutdown. As a
result, a liquid leak check of the valve
prior to flight is required as well as a
valve replacement every 18 months.
Orbiter Drag Chute: The plan is to use
the chute on every landing because it
enhances directional stability. Structural
requirements were validated by analysis.
The drag chute system was tested
successfully at the component and
system level. There still are a few tests
remaining. All nominal condition tests
with the B-52 have been completed.
Tests to expand the envelope still have
to be conducted.
Ref' Findings #18 through #21
Work performed on the Advanced Solid
Rocket Motor (ASRM) to date generally
has been well-conceived and of high
quality. The schedule does not have
much contingency time. Although
techniques can be made to work
adequately, it might take considerably
longer than planned because there is a
lot to integrate.
There are concerns about scale-up of
the pilot propellant mix and casting
facility. Many parameters and processes
have not been fully determined.
However, Aerojet has produced a
substantial amount of similar solid
propellant using continuous production
processes so the basic techniques are
familiar. The continuous solid
propellant production facilities involve a
variety of mixing and transport facilities.
Safety concerns arising from propellant
remaining in the transfer lines have
been addressed. The propellant
requires a period of 40 to 50 hours to
gel, and can be expelled from the
transfer lines for a significant time after
it enters. Hazard analyses revealed no
credible hazard that could prevent
evacuating the lines for as long as 15
hours. The propellant is normally in the
transfer tube for only about 30 minutes.
Safety devices are installed on the
propellant flow line to limit the spread
of fire in case of an accident. The flow
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line transporting the uncured propellant
has several fire breaks to prevent
propagation of a fire along the tube.
The basic safety device is an explosive-
fired guillotine valve that interrupts the
flow, with a water spray on the
propellant to lower the temperature
below the ignition point. In addition,
there is a collar in the flow line
upstream of the guillotine and on the
casting pit side of a fire wall that canbe
blown to allow the propellant to flow
out on the floor and prevent pressure
buildup. A matter that must be
considered is cleanup after an accident
involving a dump of uncured propellant
on the floor. The continuous mix pilot
plant at Aerojet provides a way of
proving a new propellant and upgrading
the equipment before establishing a full-
scale facility at Yellow Creek. The
major differences between the pilot
plant and the full-scale facility are
equipment size and process control
software. The pilot plant production
rate is 1,000to 1,400pounds/hour with
the full-scale facility producing 20,000to
26,000 pounds/hour. The ultimate
particle size of the propellant is
dependent on parameters such as
geometry of piping, length of lines, and
fluid working pressuresthat may not be
directly scaleable. There are many
challenges such as metering of
propellant solids, pre-mix of iron oxide
and aluminum, and real-time process
control. Upscaling the rotofeed
deaerator and pump equipment probably
presents the greatest challenge.
The propellant manufacturing process
includes several methods to ensure the
quality of the product. There is a 30-
minute delay loop in the propellant lines
that permits extracting and analyzing a
sample before the material reaches the
casting pit. In addition, small test
articles are cast with each batch.
Propellant samples are tested after
casting to ensureburning properties are
to specification.
A new method for assessingpropellant
quality is under development. This
Fourier Transform Infrared/Factor
Analysis (FTIR/FA) produces
"fingerprints" of the propellant being
produced. If the development proves
successful, it could be used on-line to
eliminate most of the laboratory testing
during production.
Obviously,successfuldevelopment of the
insulation strip winding process will be
a marked improvement in cost and time
to the present hand lay-up method used
in the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
(RSRM) installation. The extruder
equipment that produces the insulation
material in the process development is
identical to that specified for the Yellow
Creek facility. Initial tests of the
stripwinding were conducted on bare
metal that had been neither cleaned nor
treated with adhesive. These tests were
successfulin that the insulation did stick
to the inside of the casing.
It is necessary to develop a data base
for strip winding before producing the
48-inch insulation test articles. A 48-
inch long section of a 150-inch diameter
casewill be developed for the field joint
test article. However, the boom travel
will have to reach 400 inches for the
full-scale motor. Finally, the entire
process will be verified in the
development and qualification motor
tests.
The case will be turned on end for the
liner spraying operation. A robot arm
will traverse a vertical beam and spray
the liner on top of the white insulation.
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Much of the work to date has been
directed toward determining the proper
chemical composition of the liner.
Current plans include a visual inspection
of the liner after spraying facilitated by
the addition of black pigment to the
spray.
and ASRMs. Data received by the
Panel justifies the NASA decision. This
data consists of maximum strains
recorded at all eight hold-down posts
during 18 firings of the SpaceShuttle (1
flight readiness firing and 17 actual
launches).
The HP9-4-30 steel for the case was
selected to be forgeable, machineable,
and resistant to stresscorrosion cracking
and to general corrosion with proper
coating. The steel case will be
inspected using magnetic particle
inspection along with alternative non-
destructive inspection (NDI) methods.
The consistencyof the caseproperties is
dependent on proper process control
and development testing. A thorough
program of testing to characterize this
material is needed to support the
finalization of the case design and
manufacturing plans. This must include
development and characterization of the
manufacturing processessuch as plasma
arc welding and weld repair procedures
for the large diameter steel casing.
A key item in the propellant mixing and
casting program is the development of
the software for the overall process
control. Although contracts for
development of the software are
underway, little attention has been paid
to the design of the user interface. It
would appear that the system design
would benefit from a more complete
analysis of the interface and the
participation of an expert in human-
computer interfaces. As a basis for
making decisions, a complete task and
functional analysis should be performed.
Ref: Finding #22
Using the data received and a tensile
strain of 5,143 micro-inches as the strain
measured at 100-percent Design Limit
Load (DLL) on the static test specimen,
the confidence level in the estimated
probability that certain load levels will
or will not be exceeded can be
calculated:
The probability that DLL will be
exceeded is 5 percent, with a
confidence level of 95 percent.
The probability that 1.28 x DLL
will not be exceeded is 99.9
percent, with a confidence level
of 99 percent.
Although there is a fair likelihood that
the DLL will be exceeded, it is quite
unlikely that a failing load will be
experienced. In the above prediction,
static test failure strength was not
corrected to account for variability of
weld strength. This variable deserves
more consideration. It could be argued
that in the large volume of weld
material exposed to maximum stresses in
the test article, there existed at least
one of the maximum flaws that could
escape NDI detection. Therefore,
failures were initiated at near A-type
strength values. The fact that two test
articles failed at nearly identical values
of load lends some credence to this
argument.
NASA is committed to using the current
aft skirt configuration on all RSRMs
Calculated ASRM lift-off loads are
within aft skirt certification limits. The
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stiffer field joint design of the ASRM
versus the pinned joints of the RSRM
yields the same factor of safety of 1.28.
ASRM flight loads are favorably
affected by both the larger diameter of
the ASRM case and integrated
electronics assembly box relocation.
While a factor of safety of 1.28 is
considered adequate, radial biasing on
the spherical bearings on the holddown
posts is required to achieve it. In
addition, there is a study underway to
improve the strength of the skirt by
adding an external bracket or groove in
the skin. Due to the planned use of this
skirt on the ASRM, the exceptionally
low factor of safety at the skirt weld,
and lack of a good understanding of the
failure mechanism, NASA_ safety
organization should continue to monitor
strain data from each launch to develop
an adequate profile. This will establish
a truly credible data base for the
statistical justification of the low factor
of safety.
Ref: Finding #23
It is important to review logistics
planning activities early in a program
such as the ASRM. Approximately 10
people currently are working on ASRM
logistics representing all major
contractors and NASA groups. Plans
include maintenance, supply and
support, transportation, and training. A
line replaceable unit (LRU) list has
been prepared for flight hardware, and
a number of pieces of ground support
equipment (GSE) have been identified.
Training manual and related document
needs have been identified, and
transportation barge operations are
evolving. A good start on the ASRM
logistics has been made.
Ref: Finding #24
During the past year, several Space
Shuttle landings either experienced
problems or off-nominal performance.
Due to the planned increases in landings
at KSC rather than Edwards Air Force
Base (EAFB), with its relatively large
margins for landing error, it is important
to understand the reasons behind any
landing problems and develop ways to
prevent their recurrence.
The STS-37 landing was extremely short
and slow. There were many reasons for
the extremely low energy state of
STS-37 including:
The crew had never landed on
runway 33 at EAFB and had not
trained for its approach because it
encroaches on Los Angeles
International Airport airspace.
EAFB runway 33 approach is not
included in the simulators.
The crew were not given the most
precise wind-shear information
because:
Ground controllers were in
a high workload situation
that was caused by carrying
landing solutions for both
KSC and EAFB.
Information from the
Shuttle Training Aircraft
(STA) was not passed along
adequately; there is no
direct communication
between the STA pilot and
the Space Shuttle crew.
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The crew's belief, which was
reinforced by their training, was
that they could make up their
energy deficit during the post-
heading alignment cone portions
of TAEM or as part of approach
and landing.
STS-39 experienced some tread loss on
the right main gear and somenosewheel
abrasion. This has been attributed to a
faster than normal landing and drift near
touchdown. The right gear crossed the
crown in the KSC runway twice at high
speed, which contributed to the tire
wear. The safe limit of the tire (6 plies)
was not reached as only three plies were
damaged.
There were many lessons learned from
analyzing the STS-37and STS-39landing
anomalies. Some already have resulted
in changes in procedures and training.
Overall, a heightened awareness of
possible landing problems seemsto have
emerged. A continued focus on
communications and decision-making
during landing as well as the process of
energy management would seem to be
warranted.
Ref: Findings #25 through #30
The task team concept that has been
implemented at KSC is an approach to
involving hands-on leadership at the task
level. One of its benefits is that it keeps
jobs moving without sacrificing quality,
control, or safety. It also brings together
all personnel needed to perform a
particular job in conjunction with an
identified leader and places
responsibility at an operationally realistic
level. Specific training on operating
within a task team environment has been
developed and used by the Shuttle
Processing Contractor (SPC). Task team
leaders are selected from the ranks of
engineers and technicians as appropriate.
The task team leader concept has not yet
been widely introduced formally into
Vehicle Assembly Building operations.
However, the operations concerned with
solid rocket booster (SRB) stacking and
external tank (ET) attachment have
developed many similar characteristics.
These include a stable workforce that
has developed a team approach,
authority to accept verbal deviations with
subsequent documentation, and direct
engineering support and involvement.
In addition to the introduction of task
teams, a joint NASA/SPC Steering
Committee has been established to
oversee and improve launch processing.
The Steering Committee developed its
"Top Ten" agenda from 250 potential
improvements that could be undertaken.
As improvements are completed, new
targets are to be added to the active list.
The general revision of all Standard
Practice Instructions (SPIs), underway
for the past 6 months, has been a major
source of recommended changes that the
Steering Committee has pursued. The
workforce has been directly involved in
these revisions. The objective has been
to achieve simplification of SPIs and
streamlining of the processes.
Other targets of Steering Committee
activity include signature reduction,
reduction of witness inspections in favor
of greater surveillance and verification,
and avoiding steps that do not add value.
Additionally, the concept of a designated
verifier (where a certified technician
hand stamps his/her work such as in
airline maintenance/inspection) is being
presented to Level I management for
acceptance. A shop data collection
system is now in place to identify the
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sources of delays in Space Shuttle
processing. This system, originally
planned for inclusion in the Shuttle
ProcessingData Management SystemII
(SPDMS II), was developed as a stand-
alone because of delays in SPDMS II
development and implementation. It
will be important to ensure that this
subsystemas well as others like it that
have sprung up to fill specific needsare
adequately accounted for in the final
SPDMS II design. This can best be
accomplishedby ensuring involvement of
systemusersin the SPDMS II designand
implementation process.
Ref: Findings #31 through #38
Although some problems persist, the
Space Shuttle support programs are
generally in very satisfactory condition.
The Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP) is
an essential component of the overall
logistics and support activities for the
Space Shuttle. In 1991, there were three
ILP meetings. At these meetings,
presentations were made on subjects
germane to the activities of the meeting
host site. The wide-ranging issues that
were covered in detail included trend
management reporting; development of
computer tracking systems; control, use,
stocking, and disposal of hazardous
waste; and interface problems among
Centers and contractors. The meetings
provide for good working-level
integration and interchange on all
aspects of the Space Shuttle logistics
programs.
The Logistics Management
Responsibility Transfer (LMRT)
function was initiated to coordinate the
transfer of management skills,
equipment, and funding to the KSC
vicinity to the maximum extent practical
for greater overall launch efficiency.
LMRT involves transfer of both NASA
and contractor resources. It appears that
the present atmosphere surrounding
LMRT within the NASA Centers is one
of cautious retrenchment, thus slowing
the transfer of resources. For example,
the memorandums of agreement
(MOAs) for transfer of SRB, RSRM,
and SSME flight and GSE hardware are
all being reevaluated. Other activities,
such as thermal protection system, are
proceeding as planned. Other issues,
such as the Fleet Leader Program to
determine the best supportability and
repair strategies for the orbital
maneuvering system and reaction control
system hardware, are being reviewed for
transfer to KSC.
This year's work at the NASA Shuttle
Logistics Depot (NSLD) concentrated
upon meeting the goals for the number
of certifications contemplated and on
achieving much faster turnaround for
component repair and overhaul.
However, statistics on the number of
certifications completed can be very
misleading because some can be
completed in 18 months whereas others,
like the multiplexer/demultiplexer
(MDM), may take as long as 2½ years to
perfect using the advanced Automatic
Test Equipment (ATE) installed at
Cocoa Beach. The schedule calls for the
acceptance of six MDM units in 1992
and seven other MDMs in 1993.
Although the effort is expensive and
time-consuming, there is good reason to
believe that eventually an almost routine
checkout can be achieved using the
ATE.
On the matter of reducing component
turnaround time for the combined NSLD
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and original equipment manufacturer
activity, the latter months of 1991have
shownsome illuminating data (Figure 5).
The overall workload for repair at the
NSLD is now increasingto the point that
the backlog is becoming significant. An
example of the savings in component
repair turn-around time (RTAT) for the
rate gyro assembly refurbishment on the
SRB shows an average of 105 days
versus 160 for the OEM and a cost of
$7,936 versus $31,000. While not all of
the components being repaired or
refurbished by the NSLD have shown
such spectacular gains, the important
issue is that they are now under the
control of NASA so that appropriate
priorities may be assigned to meet
launch supply needs.
Figure 6 shows the history of
cannibalizations for recent flights. The
controls over the problem have been
noted in previous ASAP reports.
Whereas about five cannibalizations per
vehicle were reported after STS-26, the
average number is now down to two. A
few repeat items still are involved. For
example, TACAN equipment and cables
still were being swapped from OV-102
and OV-105 for OVo103 on its recent
launch (STS-48). During the last 10
flights with three vehicles in the
processing flow, there have only been
nine vehicle repairable items, three
government furnished equipment items,
and eight secondary structural items
provided by cannibalization. Overall,
this is satisfactory performance for a
limited fleet of complex vehicles.
Component RTAT performance is
improving with an overall average RTAT
through the NSLD of 45 days against
a previous 180 days for OEM-handled
components. The NSLD management
appears to be working hard to further
improve this encouraging performance.
One of the problems is that of
"streamlining" the paperwork. A typical
instance showed a particular part being
"logged in" no less than 17 times before
reaching the workbench for actual
hands-on repair work. Figure 7 shows
the reparable line replaceable unit
(LRU) fill rate up to STS-42. This
parameter is judged to be highly
satisfactory at the present time. The
overall average fill rate of 92 percent is
probably due mostly to improvements in
repair cycles.
Finding #37 discusses the "zero balance"
(or "none in stock") and those items for
which the stock is below the established
minimum safe levels. The chart shown
in Figure 8 indicates a recent sharp rise
probably due mostly to the introduction
of OV-105. This problem has the
attention of logistics management
personnel.
The problem of out-of-production spares,
or in NASA terminology "Pending loss of
repair/spare capability," can only
continue to worsen. In the majority of
cases, the principal solution must lie in
the extension of NSLD capabilities.
Obviously, some components will defy
the repair capability of even a well-
funded NSLD. With total wear-out of
these parts, the only recourse is to
institute some redesign and modification
action to keep the systems working.
Lists of critical vendors and their
components are being drawn up.
Although this situation is receiving
energetic middle management attention,
further help may be required from the
higher echelons.
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The general situation of availability of
spare SSMEs (which are supported
directly by Rocketdyne out of their
Canoga Park facilities) is satisfactory at
the present time. The history of
cannibalization within the SSME engine
shop is shown in Figure 9; the spares
requested versus those filled shows a
very satisfactory performance. Use of
expensive commercial air cargo or other
airline charter flights for turbopumps
virtually has been eliminated by the
introduction of new shipping containers.
Current issues including hydraulic
actuators, bolt and seal surveillance due
to stretched bolts, and nozzle insulation
kits, are being handled in routine
fashion.
All logistics measurement parameters for
the RSRM such as cannibalization, fill
rates, zero/below minimum balance,
RTAT, and pending loss of spare or
repair capability were in the desired
range. In addition, Thiokol has full
support capabilities at its Brigham, Utah
facility. There has been no
cannibalization on the RSRM. All
repairs of LRUs are done on a "real-
time" replacement basis in the Thiokol
Wasatch facility. Overall, inventory
control accuracy presently is running at
95 percent with a target of 100 percent.
This is a very impressive performance.
United Space Booster, Inc., (USBI)
handles the SRBs at KSC and in their
support facilities nearby. They report no
cannibalizations. Fill rate and zero/
below minimum balance issues do not
arise because production assets are used.
USBI can repair all on-site items except
the lube oil accumulator; an agreement
is being made with an alternative vendor
for this item. Only six components have
been selected for off-site repair; there
are no concerns about support by these
OEMs. RTAT for some elements of the
thrust vector control system are lengthy.
The paperwork is said to be taking
longer than repair of the hardware.
USBI is developing their own simple test
set for checkout of some of the electrical
and instrumentation components to
eliminate some of the comprehensive
test routines now being accomplished.
Off-site repair and recertification is used
in the cases of the hydraulic pumps,
servo-actuators, and APUs.
A large number of logistics-related
annual audits are now being conducted
by various agencies such as NASA, the
Air Force, and the Department of
Defense (DoD). Transfer of selected
elements of GSE and commercial
consumables is being made from MSFC/
USBI to KSC Lockheed Space
Operations Co., under the aegis of the
LMRT program. An in-production
control system (IPCS) is employed by
USBI to support the Space Shuttle by
minimizing the inventory investment.
The IPCS is based on a predetermined
flight rate rather than an "initial lay-in"
of spares. Considerable economic and
control advantages are derived from the
IPCS. A state-of-the-art integrated
electronics assembly (lEA) test set is
being developed at the USBI Slidell
facility to perform intermediate and
depot-level maintenance. The test
procedures are being simplified in the
light of experience. The general
assessment is that the USBI/SRB
logistics and maintenance work is
evolving well and is being managed
competently. The only concerns appear
to be storage capacity and the status of
some parts suppliers. A new facility is to
be built and will be available in 1994.
ET production and supportability trends
appear to be on a steady track with all
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parameters in the desired range. Fill
rate, zero balance, and below minimum
stock are under control. Somepending
issues of repair/spare capability are
being worked out. There have been no
cannibalizations and LRU replacements
are declining. RTAT issues present no
problems for the ET because items are
replaced within 24 to 28 hours from
production assets. Overall, performance
is very satisfactory.
LMRT activities for the ET are
proceeding and the transfer MOA has
been approved. Single-source vendor
activities on four items are being
pursued. An ET GSE plan to recertify
every 10 years by analysis, repair, and
replacement, currently is being reviewed.
ET logistics have initiated state-of-the-
art procedures through severaldedicated
teams including a lively Total Quality
Management (TQM) approach.
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C. AERONAUTICS
Ref: Finding #39
On August 12, 1991, NASA Management
Instruction (NMI) 7900.2 on aircraft
operations management was signed.
This NMI deals with critical functions
needed to ensure safe administrative
aircraft operations. It is understood that
a companion delineation of aviation
safety requirements in the basic safety
manual is contemplated to complete the
establishment of a proper aviation safety
management organization and
Agencywide statement of the philosophy
of aviation safety. A Headquarters
organization to coordinate flight policies
throughout NASA is needed to obtain
the maximum operational and safety
value from these various policy
statements.
Ref: Finding #40
In the current year, the ASAP only
examined the aeronautical flight
research programs at the Dryden Flight
Research Facility (DFRF). Significant
effort also is ongoing at the Langley and
Ames Research Centers; the Panel has
reviewed these in past years.
DFRF has established an impressive
array of test vehicles, which include the
X-29s, F-16XLs, SR-71s, F-18, F-15,
F-104G, B-52B, T-38, and PA-30. The
B-52G is programmed to replace the
B-52B. The aircraft are a national asset,
and should be maintained and
programmed for flight research tests at a
high utilization level.
The F-18 High-Angle-of-Attack
Research Vehicle (HARV) program
includes a massive thrust vectoring
apparatus mounted on the tail section
that (with ballast) weighs approximately
2120 pounds. It reduces the maximum
Mach number of the F-18 from 2+ to
1.2. The flight control system
modifications have been tested in the
simulator, and one closed loop (pitch
and yaw) flight has been completed.
The system currently is cleared to a 20-
degree angle-of-attack (AOA) with a
potential to trim to a 70-degree AOA. A
follow-on activity will incorporate
forebody control blowing in the nose for
yaw control experimentation.
The X-29 AOA program has completed
85 flights with very stable controllability
up to 45 degrees. The vehicle has been
flown to 70 degrees; however, loss of
vertical tail effectiveness causes a
reduction of yaw control above 40-
degrees AOA. A strong forebody/wing
vortex impinges on the vertical tail. This
can cause a fatigue problem and needs
to be monitored.
The F-15 Highly Integrated Digital
Electronic Control (HIDEC) program
has completed 36 flights. It has
demonstrated excellent performance
gains by implementation of its real-time,
adaptive optimization of the flight
control, engine, inlet, and engine nozzle.
Of great importance is the propulsion-
only flight control for landing with no or
reduced control of the aerodynamic
surfaces. This has application to both
civil and military aircraft.
The SR-71B (two-seat) is to be flown for
a year to assess and determine a set of
research programs than can best be
53
performed on this aircraft. NASA is
fortunate to havebeen given a wealth of
spare parts by the Air Force. Also, the
SR-71B had completed its periodic depot
maintenance check prior to being
assigned to NASA. Two SR-71As have
been acquired by NASA and are being
placed in flyable storage pending the
definition of suitable flight test activities.
The F-16XL aircraft currently is being
flown to evaluate the ability to produce
laminar flow in the surface of a highly
swept (65 degrees on the leading edge)
supersonic wing. A portion of the left
wing has been fitted with a glove
containing suction holes for removing
the boundary layer. A turbo-compressor
is mounted in the fuselage to produce
the wing suction. Concerns were
expressed over the potential for turbine
wheel failure with potential ensuing
damage to the aircraft. The flight tests
were begun in March 1991.
The B-52 currently is being used as a
launch vehicle for the Pegasus space
vehicle. The first two of the planned six
flights have been accomplished
successfully. The gross weight of the
Pegasus is approximately 42,000 pounds,
which is well within the load carrying
capability of the NASA B-52 pylon that
previously was used to launch the X-15
aircraft.
Another interesting test program utilizes
the Convair 990 aircraft for dynamic
tests of the Shuttle landing gear. The
Orbiter speeds and weights can be
duplicated to evaluate tire wheel
performance on various landing surfaces.
Overall, the assessment of the ASAP is
that these programs are being managed
with an acceptable emphasis on flight
safety through a rigorous process of
analyses and safety reviews.
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D. OTHER
Ref: Finding #41
Reports from crew members on extended
Space Shuttle missions that involved two
shift operations indicated that they
experienced some difficulty in achieving
restful sleep. This phenomenon is not
unusual when circadian rhythms must be
shifted. These problems are similar to
those experienced by aircraft flight crews
in long-haul operations. A program of
research and countermeasure
development on crew rest cycles and
circadian rhythm shifting to support both
Space Shuttle and Space Station
operations is needed to address this
problem. This program could
productively be modeled after the
ongoing NASA aircrew research being
conducted at the Ames Research Center
(ARC).
Ref: Finding #42
In analyzing the causes of aircraft
accidents and near accidents over the
last decade or more, case investigators
have come to rely increasingly on clues
furnished by experts in human
engineering. Individualistic behavioral
patterns performed under stress, in some
instances, have been identified as prime
contributors to the accidents. Extensive
worldwide military and civil aviation has
provided a broad data base for such
analyses. In contrast, the data base for
manned spaceflight and associated
ground operations is relatively small and
of recent origin. As a consequence, little
interest has been shown in harnessing
this discipline to spaceflight programs.
Nevertheless, as Space Shuttle flight
duration is increased to 30 days or more,
and SSF is activated, the potential for
accidents attributable to human error
will increase. For example, sleeplessness
and boredom have been highlighted as
the reason for several airplane accidents.
Therefore, the time may be opportune to
enlist the insights of human engineering
to help prevent accidents in the manned
space programs attributable to such
situations.
NASA possesses competent in-house
capabilities in human engineering,
especially at ARC and JSC. ARC, in
particular, has made frequent
contributions affecting aviation safety
whereas JSC's role principally has
involved astronaut's experiences in
spaceflight. Coordination and
information exchange between these two
Centers has not been as effective as it
might be; this is partially due to the
different programmatic responsibilities.
However, with the beginning of
operational planning for SSF, NASA
should bring about a closer relationship
between these programs and potentiate
efforts to enlist human factors research
as an agent to prevent human errors in
space activities.
Refi Finding #43
NASA has a hierarchy of reporting
systems for mishaps and incidents.
Formal documentation, including NMI
8621.1, which is currently in revision,
defines the various levels of mishaps and
investigation and reporting requirements.
At the top level, NASA operates the
NASA Safety Reporting System (NSRS).
Although named and modeled after the
Aviation Safety Reporting System
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(ASRS), that NASA runs for the FAA,
NSRS is not its analog. ASRS was
designed to provide data on near-misses
and human errors in the aviation system
(pilots, controllers, and mechanics),
which otherwise would have gone
unreported becausethey did not result in
property damage, injury, or a detected
violation. It is a voluntary system of
self-reports with the reporter being
granted limited immunity in somecases.
NSRSwasdeveloped in the aftermath of
the Challenger accident to provide a
direct line to NASA top management so
that people in the system at any level
could surface a safety concern if they
believed it to be of sufficient
importance. It perhaps is unfortunate
that NSRS was named after ASRS
because their objectives are quite
different.
Even though it is lightly used, NSRS
provides a valuable service by providing
a potential safety valve for reporting
Challenger-like situations. However,
NASA hasno systemanalogous to ASRS
that allows people to report their own
errors or near-errors in an anonymous
manner at the local level. The new task
team approach emerging at KSC
encourages some reporting of this type
but appears neither to structure it nor to
provide any expert analysis of the
information collected.
NASA is lacking a mechanism for
reporting those events in which an error
happens and is recognized by the person
involved or an observer but does not
result in a defined accident, incident,
close call, or reportable violation. For
example, a technician working on a fuel
cell might momentarily cap a vent line
that is not to be capped but immediately
realize his/her error and remove the cap
before any damage occurs. Likewise,
someone may start to turn a bolt the
wrong way but realize the mistake before
the action takes place. These types of
situations do not get attention unless
someone involved perceives a fix. In this
case, a suggestion may be generated to
management in the hope of receiving
some recognition. Otherwise, the
situation goes largely unreported.
Because the existing reporting systems
go outside the local environment (e.g., to
Safety or to Center or Headquarters
management) it is likely that a "near-
error" is perceived as too
inconsequential to warrant a report.
This is exactly the opposite of the ASRS
situation in which pilots, controllers, etc.,
have been encouraged to make a report
of any such event, no matter how
insignificant it seems. Trained analysts
then can look across events for patterns
indicating an emerging problem or
within a particular occurrence for
possible remedies.
The clear benefits from collecting
information on human errors does not
imply that an additional, highly
structured reporting system is required.
Inclusion of a training module for task
teams and quality working groups might
be sufficient if a way were devised to
amass and analyze the information over
time. The major benefit of systems such
as the ASRS is that they permit trained
analysts to spot emerging safety
problems and trends before they lead to
accidents.
Ref: Finding #44
There were two indications of a quality
control problem having to do with the
Tethered Satellite System (TSS)
program. The first occurred when a
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spare clutch to the vernier motor failed
its acceptance test due to the failure of
bonding between the rotor and the cork
clutch material. The shelf life of the
bonding had been exceeded. A question
exists regarding the flight clutch because
the bonding material shelf life is
uncertain. Investigation revealed that
neither the flight article nor the failed
spare unit had an adequate build paper
with quality assurance acceptance.
There are two other flight clutch
assemblies that do possess the proper
documentation.
The primary control of the trajectory of
the TSS is the rate of extension or
retraction of the tether. Since an
accurate analytical prediction of the
system dynamics is directly related to the
ability to control roll, all components of
the system, including the clutch, should
be without operational uncertainties.
The other problem involved a shipment
of 15-5 stainless steel material that was
marked incorrectly as not needing heat
treatment. It was used erroneously to
manufacture 18 parts in the mechanism
that deploys the TSS. Therefore, these
18 parts have a lower hardness and
strength than was intended -- assuming
they had been heat treated. Initial
investigation by NASA and Martin
Marietta indicate the parts will not have
a critical impact on the operation or
safety of the TSS.
Ref: Findings #45 and #46
Current plans for long-term use of the
Space Shuttle, and assembly and
operation of the SSF suggest a continued
and increasing need for extravehicular
activities (EVAs). Although excellent
efforts have been mounted and are
ongoing to reduce the need for EVAs
whenever possible, contingencies, design
requirements, and economics each will
dictate the need for some EVA
activities. These EVAs must be
supported by an appropriately designed
extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) and
associated space suit. For example,
current projections for the on-orbit
repair of the Hubble Space Telescope
(HST) call for three separate EVAs,
each lasting over 6 hours. This is a more
ambitious EVA profile than previously
has been attempted.
As the demand for both the number and
duration of EVAs increases, the benefits
possible from an improved EMU and
suit to support them become clear.
Existing suits and their associated
portable life support system (PLSS) have
several characteristics that limit their
flexibility and utility. They operate at
low pressure thereby requiring extensive
prebreathing of pure oxygen to avoid
problems associated with nitrogen
bubbles in the blood ("the bends"). This
could be severely limiting if an
emergency EVA or an EVA evacuation
is needed from the Space Station. Even
if sufficient prebreath time is available,
this activity places additional workload
on the EVA crews, which might be more
productively allocated to the EVA
activity. This, in turn, could potentially
reduce the number of EVAs required
because crew members could work more
productively and accomplish more on
each EVA. In addition, the
refurbishment and sizing of the existing
suits is extremely time-consuming and
labor intensive and can now only be fully
accomplished on the ground.
NASA already has explored the
technology needed to overcome these
problems. Two programs, the AX-5 at
the ARC and the Mark 3 at the JSC,
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have built and tested prototype suits that
do much to overcome the problems
inherent in the current design. Neither
the AX-5 nor the Mark 3 are complete
solutions to all of the problems inherent
in having humans work in space.
However, they successfully have
demonstrated that a more flexible design
capable of on-orbit maintenance and
sizing and eliminating or reducing
prebreathing requirements is possible.
They have further demonstrated that
there are no significant technological
issues associated with producing these
improvements.
Existing budgetary constraints have
prompted the deletion of most funding
for completing development of an
advanced suit and EMU. Because the
existing suits continue to perform
satisfactorily on Space Shuttle missions,
a decision to defer some or even most of
the costs of developing a new suit is not
umeasonable. However, it is clear that
the ultimate implementation of SSF can
be greatly enhanced by an improved suit
design. Therefore, NASA should
commit to specification and development
of a new suit, and establish its
implementation schedule consistent with
budget availability. One possible
pathway to upgrading the suit design
would be to couple the existing PLSS
with a new suit based on AX-5/Mark 3
technologies. The PLSS could be
modified to operate at a higher pressure
to reduce prebreathing time and take
maximum advantage of the design
qualities of the new suits. As funds and
time permit, the PLSS could be replaced
with an upgraded EMU that could be
based, in part, on lessons learned from
the already planned extended EVAs for
HST repair and Space Station assembly.
It also would seem wise for NASA to
support the research necessary to
characterize more fully the bends risk
associated with micro-gravity EVA
activities. Existing tables relating
prebreathing time and atmospheric
pressure are based on pressure chamber
and deep sea diving experience. While
these are good analogies, they ignore the
influence of micro-gravity and the
exertion levels expected of EVA
astronauts. NASA has the research
expertise and the data collection
opportunities during on-ground
simulations and Space Shuttle flights to
collect the data necessary to clarify this
issue. A potential side benefit of
conducting this research would be a
significant clarification of the need for
and use of hyperbaric airlocks on the
Space Station.
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APPENDIX B
NASA RESPONSE TO MARCH 1991 ANNUAL REPORT
SUMMARY
In accordance with the Panel's letter of transmittal, NASA_s response dated June 17,
1991, covered the "Findings and Recommendations" from the March 1990 Annual
Report.
Based on the Panel's review of that response and the information gathered during the
1990 period, the Panel considers that the following 3 of the 34 original items noted in
the June 17th response are "open" at this time:
Finding/Recommendation No. and Subject Comments
#2 Space Shuttle Autoland System The Panel will continue to follow the
Autoland progress.
#4 Space Shuttle Software Verification
and Validation
The Panel will revisit this system.
#10 Integration of ASRM/RSRM Plan Schedule problems warrant Panel
review.
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NASA
National Aeronautics and
S pace Administration
Washington, D.C.
20546
Office o_ the AdminIstrator
JUN 17 f991
Mr. No,an R. Paget
Cha i_an
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
5907 Sunrise Drive
Fai_ay, KS 66205
Dear Mr.
In accordance with your introductory letter to the
March 1991 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual Report,
I am enclosing NASA's detailed response to Section II, "Findings
and Recommendations."
The dedication of the ASAP members to NASA continues to be
commendable. Your recommendations have helped reduce risk and
improve safety in NASA manned/unmanned programs and projects.
Your efforts are great]y appreciated.
We thank you and your fellow Panel members for your
valuable contribution and look forward to the next report. As
always, ASAP recommendations are highly regarded and receive the
full attention of our senior management.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE SHUTrLE PROGRAM
Orbiter
Finding #1: NASA has planned to implement the wing/fuselage modifications indicated by
the results of the 6.0 load analysis. Modification work has been scheduled for 0I/-102, and
plans are being developed for the remainder of the fleet."
Recommendation _1: The implementation of these modifications should be
accomplished as soon as possible so that the restricted flight envelope (green
squatcheloid) parameters can be safely upgraded.
NASA Response: Concur. Modifications are scheduled for each vehicle's Orbiter
Maintenance Down Period (OMDP). The OMDP has been incorporated into the Space
Shuttle Program to provide dedicated times for performing detailed vehicle structural
inspections, subsystem inspections and internal functional checks as well as modifications.
All vehicle modifications will be complete by mid-1993.
Finding #2: The uncertainties surrounding crew performance after extended stays in space
suggest a need for an alternative to manual landings.
Recommendation ¢t2: The Space Shuttle Program should complete the development of a
reliable autoland system for the Orbiter as a backup.
NASA Response: Concur. The existing Shuttle autoland system is certified and is a
reliable backup for 16-day Extended Duration Orbiter missions. A significant program
to collect crew performance data is being undertaken by the Office of Space Science and
Applications during flights involving incremental increases of on-orbit duration. Current
plans involve flying four 10-day flights and three 13-day flights prior to the first 16-day
flight. Crew performance data will be evaluated and must be judged acceptable prior to
commitment to the next increment of extended duration.
Finding #3: With plans to extend Orbiter use well into the next century, it will be necessary
to upgrade the Orbiter computer systems several times. The present, rather ad hoc, approach
of treating each upgrade as an independent action will be unsatisfactory for the long term.
Recommendation _3: NASA should accept the need for an upgrade involving a
complete software reverification approximately every 10 years. A study should be
undertaken to plan a path of evolution for all future changes in avionics computer
hardware and software for the life of the Space Shuttle Program. The study should
involve independent assessment to ensure the broadest possible perspective.
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NASA Resoonse: Concur. NASA has just completed integrating the Improved General
Purpose Computer (IGPC) into the fleet. This upgrading of the orbiter computers
included an extensive reverification of the flight software. Integrated testing of the flight
hardware and software was one of the milestones in the certification of the IGPC
hardware and flight software. In addition, the Shuttle software is incrementally upgraded
and released for flight approximately every eight months. These upgrades are validated,
verified, and certified through an extensive and thorough process. Future computing
capability beyond recent incorporation of the IGPC is under development in the Assured
Shuttle Availability (ASA) Program in the Multifunction Electronics Display Subsystem
(MEDS). The plan for the subsequent 10-15 years involves maintaining the existing
system. Issues involving obsolescence and enhanced performance will continue to be
reviewed.
Finding #4: The Space Shuttle flight software generation process is very complex. It
includes numerous carefully designed safeguards intended to ensure that no faulty software is
ever loaded. When errors have occurred, or wizen concerns have been raised about steps in
the procedure, new safeguards have been added. The whole process is long, complicated,
and involves a plethora of organizations and computers.
Recommendation #4: NASA should conduct an independent review of its entire
software generation, verification, validation, object build, and machine loading process
for the Space Shuttle. The goals should be to ascertain whether the process can be made
less complex and more efficient.
NASA Response: Concur. An independent review has been completed of NASA's entire
software generation, verification, validation, object code build, and machine loading
process. As part of the post-51L activity, NASA contracted with Intermetrics Inc., as the
independent verification and validation (IV&V) contractor. NASA is developing a policy
to define the scope of our independent oversight activity. To assist in this task, NASA
has requested the National Research Council to perform an independent review of the
IV&V process to include software generation, object code build, and machine loading.
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
Findintz #5: The SSME is now available in sufficient numbers to support all the Orbiters.
A suitable number of spare engines are available at the launch site.
Recommendation #5: Keep up the good work while recognizing any demands imposed
by changes in planned launch rates.
NASA Response: Thank you. We intend to maintain a good posture on spare engines.
Finding #6: Tile program to develop safety and reliability improvements to the current
SSME is meeting with a large degree of success. However, some components, like the pump
end of the High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) and the two-duct power head have
not been successful. The bearing housing at the pump end of the HPOTP has not met its
objectives, and an operational solution has been devised to accommodate the resulting small
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number of allowable reuses between overhauls. Premature combustion chamber cracking
and injector erosion were experienced with the two-duct powerhead.
Recommendation _6" Continue the development and certification of the safety
improvements so that they may be incorporated at the earliest possible time.
NASA Respor_se: Concur. The SSME Project is continuing certification of both the 10K
pumps and development of the two-duct powerhead through hot-fire testing at SSC and
detailed engineering reviews of the test results. This effort will continue to develop
these safety improvements for incorporation at the earliest possible time.
Finding #7: The Alternate Turbopump Program has encountered a number of design
problems during testing. Fixes are being incorporated and fed into development testing.
Planning for completion of component-level testing and entering the engine-level test phase is
very optimistic, especially in view of the difficulties experienced in completing test runs on the
component test stand.
Recommendation #7: Schedule pressures can engender the temptation to truncate the
component test plans and objectives. Do not compromise the objectives and
thoroughness of the planned component test program to start engine-level testing at the
time currently scheduled.
NASA Response: Concur. In recent weeks, component-level testing for the alternate
turbopump development (ATD) program has provided improved testing results. Using
SSC testing to supplement component testing will add to the fidelity of the component
testing program. The ATD Test Program will not truncate or compromise the objectives
and thoroughness of the planned component testing.
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) and Advanced Solid Rocket Booster (ASRB)
Finding #8." NASA is planning to use the existing Solid Rocket Booster aft skirt on the
Advanced Solid Rocket Booster. The requisite Factor of Safety is to be achieved by biasing
the spherical bearings at the hold-down posts.
Recommendation _8: The aft skirt design for the Advanced Solid Rocket Booster should
be inherently strong enough to achieve a Factor of Safety of 1.4.
NASA Response: A factor of safety of 1.4 is not necessary for the Redesigned Solid
Rocket Booster Aft Skirt since the loading of this structure is well understood. The
Space Shuttle Program has been operating the current Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) with
an aft skirt factor of safety of 1.28. The current radial biasing of the Spherical Bearings
assures that this 1.28 factor of safety is achieved. Additional radial biasing, improved
loads definition, and possible structural modifications, are being studied for their
potential to further increase the factor of safety for the ASRB.
Small inward biasing of the pedestal spherical bearings has been used successfully since
STS-28 as a means of increasing structural factor of safety. The biasing imparts a
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compressivepreload in the area of the critical aft skirt weld, thus helping to offset the
tensile load induced there during SSME Thrust Build-up.
Efforts are also underway to improve even further the definition of Aft Skirt loads.
Strain gauge instrumentation on skirts has provided an extensive data base since STS-26
and such data gathering will continue on the current SRB. An improved definition of
ASRB Aft Skirt Loads will be available as the ASRB Structural Models are developed.
Also, structural modifications are being studied that will enhance the load carrying
capability of the skirts for the ASRB. With biasing and structural modifications, the aft
skirt factor of safety will be maximized, but achieving a safety factor of 1.4 is not an
absolute requirement.
Finding #9: The Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor manufacturer has made impressive strides
in the quality of industrial operations. Incorporation of existing state-of-the-art automation
for manufacturing and assembly processes is continuing.
Recommendation #9: Continue the industrial enhancements to achieve further reduction
of requirements for hands-on labor and increased product quality.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA is incorporating enhancements in the Thiokol
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor manufacturing facilities and processes in the areas of
propellant mixing, casting, and in final assembly operations. These enhancements
involve new facilities for automated propellant premix, sample casting, a modified
oxidizer facility, and new propellant analysis equipment. For final assembly, there will
be a new six-bay segment processing building with vertical nozzle installation capability
and other handling improvements.
Finding #10: The use of the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor and Redesigned Solid Rocket
Motor during the same time frame will pose procedural and test challenges because of their
different configurations and performance characteristics.
Recommendation _10: NASA and its contractors should develop a well integrated plan
for such concurrent operations.
NASA Response: Concur. An integrated plan to govern program transition from SRB
Operations to ASRB Operations is under development. This plan will show how Space
Shuttle Program goals will be met within the technical constraints involved in integrating
a new element into Shuttle operations. The development of the SRB-to-ASRB transition
plan is scheduled to be completed by July 1991. Once complete, this transition plan will
be incorporated into the System Integration Plan and controlled at Level II. This will
ensure that any proposed changes to the transition plan will receive total program
review.
Finding #11: The test program for the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor/Advanced Solid
Rocket Booster has been well planned and uses the many lessons learned from the ongoing
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor project. There are, however, a number of uncertainties
including characterizing the physical and manufacturing properties of the case material.
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Recommendation #11: The project should provide an allowance for contingencies
beyond those indicated in the current schedules and budgets to account for proper
closure/resolution of expected test results.
NASA Res_oonse: The ASRM Program cost/schedule is under review as Congress
considers the FY 92 Budget request. Our desire is to have a reasonable allowance for
schedule reserve, but budget pressures will likely drive us to a somewhat success oriented
schedule where further schedule margin will have to come from first flight date.
Finding #12: NASA has embarked upon an ambitious program of automation for
manufacturing the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor. The new automation will be a significant
step forward and an impressh,e accomplishment. However, there are concerns about the
feasibility of completing automation of this scale in the time frame indicated. Therefore,
there may be significant delays in the availability of the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor.
Recommendation #12: NASA should be prepared to extend use of the Redesigned Solid
Rocket Motor beyond current plans.
NASA Response: Concur. A 1-year overlap of RSRM and ASRM is planned to cover
contingencies. While the degree of automation planned for the ASRM manufacturing
facilities is ambitious, the process development involves an acceptable degree of schedule
risk. Since construction of facilities and development of the manufacturing processes
precedes the design verification phase of the program, any schedule delays would occur
at a time when adjustments to extend the use of the RSRM can be made.
Finding #13: h is planned to move the highly instrumented T-97 Solid Rocket Motor
Dynamics Test Stand from Utah to the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi for use during the
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Program rather than constructing an equivalent new test
stand. This will leave the current Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor Program without a
dynamic test facility support.
Recommendation #13: Retain the current T-97 dynamic test stand at the Utah site to
support the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor Program. A new dynamic test stand should
be constructed for the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor at Stennis Space Center.
NASA Response: Relocating the T-97 Test Stand Hardware to Stennis Space Center
(SSC) is being considered as a cost-effective means of meeting the combined testing
needs of the RSRM and ASRM Projects. It has been determined that neither the
ASRM or RSRM test stands require dynamic (side load) test capability. This plan
leaves the T-24 Test Stand at Thiokol for RSRM tests and moves the T-97 Test Stand
(without dynamic capability) to SSC for ASRM.
External Tank (ET)
Findimz #14: The external tank project is moving along very well.
v
Recommendation #14: Keep up the good work.
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NASA Response: Thank you.
Finding #15: This past year, NASA management has postponed Space Shuttle launches
when technical uncertainties existed, declared a hiatus during the Christmas season and
interrupted launch operations until the cause of hydrogen leaks could be determined and
resolved. This is clear evidence of NASA management's commitment to the principle of
"safety first, schedule second."
Recommendation #15: NASA management should maintain this policy even as Shuttle
launches become more frequent.
NASA Response" Strongly concur.
Launch And Landing Operations
Finding _16: Reports indicate that launch processing operations at the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) are being carried out with a declining rate of incidents. This is a trend in the
right direction since the extreme sensitivity of Shuttle launch processing requires reducing
errors to the lowest possible levels.
Recommendation #16: KSC, the Shuttle Processing Contractor, and associate contractors
should continue to make all possible efforts to reduce incidents. However, care must be
exercised to ensure that any observed decrease in incident reports is not merely an
artifact of the reporting system. In particular, if management's response to incident
reporting is perceived as punitive in nature, the net result may be a suppression of
reporting with a resultant reduction in the information available to management on
which to identify problems and design remedial actions. Total Quality Management
(TQM) techniques can be of great assistance. Likewise, the inclusion of human factors
professionals on incident investigation teams can be very beneficial. Therefore, KSC
should consider both an enhanced TQM program and a broader use of human factors.
NASA Response: Concur. KSC and the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) are
continuing to try to reduce incidents, even beyond the success we have had to date. We
are accomplishing this through a network of preplanning, communication, and
coordination that encourages everyone to work together and understand that they are an
essential part of the task at hand. Management takes no punitive action against any
worker for incidents unless it is clearly shown that the worker had a preconceived
negative intent or makes the mistake repetitively (more than twice). For repetitive
errors, the worker is simply reassigned to other tasks and/or retrained. Any repetitive
error is automatically evaluated from the human factors viewpoint. It should be noted
that human factors concepts have been used throughout the creation and verification of
all Orbiter Maintenance Instructions (OMIs) and the initial performances of all tasks
involved in vehicle processing. With quality control checks at all levels from planning,
engineering, OMI creation, and progressive steps of task team work, we are practicing
TQM and reducing incidents. We will continue to use enhanced TQM and a broader
use of human factors, as appropriate.
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Finding _17: There is a perception among some workers at KSC that disciplinary actions
for errors are overly severe.
Recommendation _17: NASA and its contractors should make every effort to
communicate the facts and rationale for disciplinary actions to the work force and
involve workers in incident reviews. TQM techniques can be of great assistance. There
is simply no substitute for sincere communication between management and labor in
dispelling negative perceptions.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA is very concerned about the potential that such a
perception may exist. KSC and SPC have instituted a program of vertical and lateral
communications that extends from the highest KSC management levels (both civil service
and SPC) down through middle management, engineering, and the task team technical
floor workers. Practices include weekly meetings at top management levels, daily reviews
at middle management and throughout engineering, and per shift (or more) coordination
sessions at the task team level. There are also horizontal channels for coordination from
hands-on-workers, logistics/supply elements, and support operations. It is continually
stressed throughout these channels that disciplinary action for errors will not be severe
or punitive unless the errors or incidents result from clearly proven negative intent. All
employees are advised of their obligation to come to work fit and able, and to perform
the tasks carefully and successfully. Any error is discussed with the responsible employee
and efforts made to help him or her understand how to avoid a repetition.
Finding _18: There are cases in which recurring waivers are sought and issued for the same
subsystem or component on successive Space Shuttle flights. For example, waivers have had
to be issued to fly with the tumble valve disabled on the external tank.
.Recommendation #18." Continuing waivers for the same condition should not be
permitted. If it is deemed acceptable to fly repeatedly with a configuration that varies
from specifications, the specifications should be altered rather than risk diluting the
significance of waivers by making them routine. For example, the underlying
specification for the tumble valve could be changed to require its inclusion only on high
inclination launches.
NASA Response: Concur in principle. The ASAP is correct in suggesting that there are
continuing waivers where the specification can be changed; a good example is the tumble
valve. Based on Flight Data for tanks with an active tumble system, the tumble systems
were disabled on selected flights based on analysis of External Tank (ET) Rupture
Altitude and the corresponding debris footprint. Flight and tracking data were used to
determine the correlation between non-tumble system tank trajectories, ET motion, ET
Rupture Altitude and the ET Debris Model. Based on these analyses and flight tests,
the applicable specification was changed to preclude the necessity for continuing ET
Tumble System Waivers. However, it should be pointed out that waiver disposition is
never "routine." As outlined above, a request for waivers or to change a specification
requires rigorous supporting data (many times flight data) presented through a series of
at least three change control boards. Specifications have been, and will continue to be,
changed where it is proved that the limits should be revised for all flights.
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Mission Operations
Finding #19: The Mission Control computer support system is quite old, relatively slow, and
has monochrome displays primarily of tabular data. The advantages of applying current
technology to Mission Control are being explored with the Real-Time Data System at the
Johnson Space Center (JSC).
Recommendation #19: NASA should embark upon a systematic process to replace the
old Mission Control system with one based upon up-to-date computer and human
interface system technology.
NASA Response: Concur. Since 1986, NASA has been in a phased process of upgrading
the operational elements of the Mission Control Center (MCC) to incorporate advanced
technology. This includes the replacement and upgrade of mainframe computers, and
the placement over the last 2 years of current generation workstations in the MCC that
are capable of using advanced techniques for analyzing and displaying data. These
enhancements are part of a comprehensive multi-year plan developed to introduce new
technology into the operating environment.
Finding #20: The majority of ttle safety and reliability enhancements that the Panel
suggested be included in the Assured Shuttle Availability Program have been undertaken by
NASA. It now appears that under this same label, NASA is undertaking a program of
Space Shuttle modifications whose primary objectives are life extension and the elimination
of obsolescence. This could lead to confusion.
Recommendation #20: The Panel urges that the two sets of objectives be pursued
through independent, separately titled, but coordinated programs.
NASA Response: The Space Shuttle Program considers safety changes to be the
responsibility of the baseline program and funds are made available to implement these
changes. A recent example is the modification of the Orbiter External Tank door
fixture. This modification was not planned nor budgeted, but was immediately
implemented.
The objective of the Assured Shuttle Availability (ASA) Program is to keep the Shuttles
flying well into the 21st century. The program addresses supportability, maintainability,
and safety margin issues. Previously ad hoc programs will be combined in the future into
a structured program that will prioritize candidates and manage the programs with
managers whose primary function will be development programs.
The current approved programs include the Multifunction Electronics Display Subsystem
and the Hardware Interface Module. These programs are primarily obsolescence
(supportability) programs. The other approved program, SSME Advanced Fabrication,
replaces main engine obsolete manufacturing techniques by using castings versus
weldments. The goal is to reduce cost and eliminate many Criticality 1 failures. The
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SpaceShuttle Program will continue to managesafetyenhancements. The ASA Program
primarily will provide program supportability, but alsowill increasesafetymargins,where
applicable.
Finding #21: The Orbiter logistics and support systems are continuing to evolve
satisfactorily. The expansion of component overhaul and repair facilities at the launch site
and in the nearby areas is most impressive. Liaison between all NASA Centers and
contractors appears to be excellent, and the control and communications networks are being
further improved.
Recommendation _21: Continue with the philosophy of centralizing Orbiter spares
support and overhaul/repair activity in the KSC area. Good work!
NASA Response" Concur. Thank you.
Finding #22: The total elapsed time for repair and turnaround of many repairable
components is still too high. Delays in accomplishing failure analysis appears to be a major
part of the problem.
Recommendation _22: Continue to take all steps necessary to reduce turnaround time.
NASA Response: Concur. Turnaround times continue to receive NASA management
attention. KSC logistics personnel frequently review with the logistics contractor those
items that have been in the repair process for longer than 180 days. These reviews
provide an incentive for the logistics contractor to ensure that vendor repairs are not
delayed for other than engineering concerns. In addition, the transition of repair
capability from the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to the NSLD will
continue to shorten overall turnaround time. The overall turnaround time for the last 3
calendar years has decreased significantly: 194 days in 1988, 174 days in 1989, and 155
days in 1990.
Finding #23: While the overall cannibalbation problem appears to be under good control,
there are still a few shortages of high-value items such as Auxiliary Power Units (APUs).
Recommendation _23: Review, once again, the critical supply issues in long-lead and
high-value items to ensure an adequate spares level to avoid the safety problems
associated with cannibalization.
NASA Response: Concur. There are still a few shortages of high-value and long-lead
items. These shortages are being addressed either through modification/improvement
programs (as for the APUs) or through additional procurement (as for the reaction
control system thrusters).
Finding #24: Out-of-production, aging, and obsolescent parts are a growing problem.
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Recommendation ¢t24: Increased emphasis should be given to ensuring the availability of
sufficient quantity of up-to-date hardware.
NASA Response" Concur. NASA recognizes the potential problem posed by obsolete
parts. KSC has instituted a three-part program to minimize the impact that obsolescence
could have on orbiter logistics supportability. The program includes identification of
potentially obsolete parts; evaluation of available prevention options; and tracking of
obsolescence data, including actions taken. These actions are taken in conjunction with
the Assured Shuttle Availability Program. The increased emphasis on parts obsolescence
should ensure the ability of KSC to provide up-to-date hardware for orbiter launch
processing.
Finding #25: There does not appear to be a comprehensive and realistic plan for scheduling
and accomplishing major overhaul of the Orbiter fleet.
Recommendation #25: To help ensure structural integrity of each vehicle, much greater
effort must be devoted to these tasks. A comprehensive program should be developed
for the orderly overhaul of Orbiters that are expected to operate into the 21st century.
NASA Response: Concur. The Space Shuttle Program has developed and instituted a
plan by which the orbiter vehicles are inspected and modified every 3 years. This plan
involves the use of specific orbiter flow periods commonly referred to as Orbiter
Maintenance Down Period (OMDP) to perform vehicle structural inspections and
modifications. The orbiter structural inspection will verify the integrity of primary
structural elements of the vertical tail, flight control surfaces, aft fuselage, mid-fuselage,
landing gear, crew module and forward fuselage. Critical elements will be inspected for
corrosion, fatigue, deformation and cracks, which would result in reduced structural
integrity. Flow periods of 188 days have been allocated for an OMDP. OV-102 is the
first vehicle to be scheduled for an OMDP and will begin in FY 91. OV-103 and OV-
104 are currently scheduled to begin their modification/inspections periods in FY 92.
The Space Shuttle Program will continue to use OMDP's to inspect and modify each
orbiter throughout a vehicles operational lifetime to ensure each orbiter's structural
integrity and upgrade the systems as required to ensure operations through 2020.
B. SPACE STATION FREEDOM PROGRAM
Finding #26: The Space Station Freedom Program has been plagued by technical,
managerial, and budgetary difficulties since its inception. The instability of this program
coupled with extensive externally stipulated design constraints has made it extremely difficult
to conduct this program in a sound and orderly manner. The program has suffered from the
absence of a clearly defined primary purpose that has resulted in an incomplete specification.
Also, there has been a lack of effective systems engineering and systems integration activity.
Recommendation #26: The purpose and funding of the redefined Space Station
Freedom Program must be firmly agreed upon by the Congress and NASA. Then,
NASA should be permitted to organize and manage the program. Systems engineering,
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systemintegration, and risk managementmust be integral and vital parts of the revised
program.
NASA Response: Concur. The restructured Space Station Freedom program plan
successfully responds both to the guidance of the Congress on funding and function and
to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space
Program, the Augustine Panel. The restructured plan enjoys strong support from the
Administration and from many elements of the Congress. This consensus should permit
NASA to go forward with a stable program and a consistent interaction of engineering
design and risk management.
C. AERONAUTICS
Finding #27: Past ASAP reports have cited concerns over the extent of Headquarters
involvement in aircraft operations safety. During the past year, a reorganization and
redelineation of Headquarters safety responsibilities has gotten underway.
Recommendation #27: NASA should follow through with the implementation of
Headquarters policies regarding the safety of the operation of NASA's aircraft.
NASA Response: Concur. The responsibilities for aviation safety and aircraft operations
have been clarified. New management instructions have been drafted to document the
responsibilities. These instructions are in their final coordination phase. NASA w///
follow through with the implementation of these policies.
_$_CH i_D_NO_GY
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Finding #28: The joint Air Force/NASA high angle of attack program conducted at the
Dryden Flight Research Facility has been a model of safe and efficient experimental flight
testing.
Recommendation #28: NASA should document the experience of this flight test
program in the tradition of the NASA/NACA flight test reporting.
NASA Response: Concur. Flight test results will be documented thoroughly, and findings
and lessons learned will be disseminated NASAwide. Aeronautical Research Flight Test
Programs in NASA will continue to be the model for safe and efficient experimental
flight testing for the U.S. aviation community. Safety will continue to be the most
important principle in our research and testing programs, and this philosophy will be
clearly presented in all related documentation.
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D. SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Findinte #29: The use of Fault Tree Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
techniques proved to be valuable in solving the hydrogen leak problems on STS-35 and STS-
38. Their use led to the identification of probable sources of the hydrogen leaks, the
probable causes of these leaks, and the nature of the corrective actions needed.
Recommendation ¢t29: Use of these techniques for problem resolution should be
encouraged throughout NASA. Suitable training programs should be established to
ensure proper implementation.
NASA Response: Concur. Fault-tree analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) are techniques fundamental to the NASA systems engineering
disciplines. They are used throughout system development to enable early identification
of problems, and assign hardware and software criticality. Critical Item Lists (CILs) are
tabulated by criticality level and require review, resolution, or waiver before flight is
approved. FTA is used by the safety organizations to provide top-down analyses of
safety-critical problems, while the FMEA is a bottom-up approach that begins at the
parts level. Both formal and informal on-the-job training in these techniques is provided.
Finding #30: NASA has a TQM program intended to improve quality and productivity
within NASA and its contractors. The implementation of the TQM (or its equivalent)
concept, however, has been quite variable across the NASA Centers and contractors.
Recommendation #30: The principles of TQM have merit when implemented by a
dedicated and concerned management. NASA should implement a consistent TQM
methodology that ensures adherence to those principles and participation of all levels of
the work force.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA's ongoing emphasis on quality and productivity
improvement (QPI) began in 1982, with an internal and external focus. In 1986, a
special emphasis was placed on the external efforts in recognition that the majority of
the NASA budget is allocated to contractors. In fact, Martin-Marietta/Michoud (which
was referenced in the ASAP report) was evaluated under the NASA Excellence Award
Program and won in 1987 for their quality achievements. In 1989-90, a renewed
emphasis was placed on internal QPI programs, while still maintaining our external
efforts. In February 1990, NASA formally launched an internal TQM initiative, and
recently conducted a NASAwide TQM assessment. We are now planning an internal
TQM evaluation initiative patterned after the George M. Low Trophy (NASA's Quality
and Excellence Award program) using TQM criteria contained in the President's Award
for Quality and Productivity Improvement. NASA top-level management is committed
to successfully implementing the TQM program and will be directly involved in
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formulating strategiesfor achievingNASA TQM program goals. The TQM Steering
Committee, consistingof NASA senior management,will report on the status and
progressof TQM implementation at their Fall 1991meeting.
Finding #31: NASA has a management instruction (NMI 8621.1E) that addresses "Mishap
Reporting and Investigation." This NMI includes a specification of board composition. It
does not, however, realistically address the need for human factors input in such
investigations. It notes that if human factors are thought to be substantially involved, then
human factor input is to be sought from a "NASA or resident NASA contractor physician"
rather than a trained human factors expert. Also, this NMI does not require investigation of
"close calls."
Recommendation #31: Inclusion of a member on the incident/accident investigation
board with specific human factors expertise should be given much greater consideration.
"Close-call" investigations should be more formalized.
NASA Response: Concur. NASA is investigating the human element in all NASA
mishaps. Efforts are currently underway to refine and update NMI 8621.1E. Part of this
effort will be the transition of NASA Mishap Investigation Board Membership
requirements to the Basic Safety Manual, NHB 1700.1. Consideration will be given to
incorporating a requirement to have a Human Factors Engineering professional assigned
to a NASA Mishap Investigation Board during this transition. The NASA Headquarters
Safety Division is sponsoring a Human Error Avoidance Project at KSC that includes
funding for a full-time Human Factors Engineering professional. This individual will be
available to participate in future mishap investigations at KSC. Formalization of the
NASA close-call investigation process is also a NASA concern. The update to NMI
8621.1E will stipulate investigation of Type A, B, and C mishap-related close-calls as a
requirement in the Basic Policy for NASA Mishap Reporting and Investigation. Under
the current policy, all close-calls must be reported; close-call reports are evaluated at
NASA Headquarters and, when necessary, an investigation board is established.
E. OTHER
Finding #32: NASA has undertaken a well organized, 5-year program for safety and
operational renovation/revitalization of some of its major experimental research facilities.
Recommendation #32: NASA and the Congress should continue to keep in focus the
importance of preserving and periodically updating the physical plants and research
facilities at NASA Centers. The current program should be continued and extended to
cover the facilities that were not included because of funding limitations.
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NASA Response: Concur. There should be a continuing focus on the importance of
preserving and periodically updating the physical plants and research facilities at the
NASA Centers. NASA's current efforts emphasize the rehabilitation and modernization
of their 40- to 50-year-old wind tunnel facilities.
Finding #33: NASA's current plans for Space Station and the Space Exploration Initiative
will inevitably involve the need for both planned and contingency extravehicular activities
(EVA's).
Recommendation #33: The planning and design for Space Station and other manned
space exploration programs should make every attempt to minimize dependence on
EVA. In addition, NASA should undertake the development of an improved
Extravehicular Mobility Unit that eliminates or reduces the maintenance and operational
problems inherent in the current suit designs.
NA,SA Response: Concur. The planning and design for the Space Station Freedom
(SSF) and other manned programs should minimize extravehicular activity (EVA).
Subsequent to the SSF External Maintenance Task Team (EMTl'-Fisher-Price) study,
the External Maintenance Solutions Team (EMST) was formed to evaluate EMTI"
findings/recommendations and provide further recommendations for mitigating EVA
requirements. Many of the EMST recommended actions were incorporated by program
management and additional actions were developed during the restructuring activity;
other recommendations are still being evaluated. NASA concurs that development of an
improved Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)/Space Suit is desirable but budgetary
constraints preclude pursuing that activity at this time. Two candidate designs for the
EMU have been studied at the Johnson Space Center and Ames Research Center.
Findin_ #34: The tethered satellite concept involves potentially operational activities that
have never been attempted and that cannot be simulated on the ground before flight.
Hazard studies and analyses have revealed the possibility of the Orbiter becoming adversely
affected by the tether in the event of a malfunction during extension, while deployed, during
retraction, or during stowage.
Recommendation #34: Program risk management should continue to focus on the results
of the principal hazard analyses and their implication for Space Shuttle and satellite
control.
NASA Response: Concur. The risk management process for the Tethered Satellite
System (TSS) continues to focus on hazard analyses and their implications for the Space
Shuttle Program. There is an operating strategy that assures all potential satellite
control issues will not become hazardous to the Shuttle. A "Safety of Flight" operations
envelope is being defined using performance gates that assure Orbiter maneuvers used to
avoid contact (breakout techniques) remain viable during all TSS mission phases. The
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"Mission Success"operations envelopeis contained within the safety of flight envelope so
that mission success will not conflict with safety. The performance gates will be reflected
in the flight rules and console documentation. The hazard analysis and safety review
process along with operations working groups are proceeding at greater levels of detail
to continue to implement this strategy.
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APPENDIX C
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL ACTIVITIES
FEBRUARY 1991 - JANUARY 1992
FEBRUARY
19-22
26
MARCH
22
APRIL
30
MAY
1
2-3
9
21
22
22
28
JUNE
17-19
19
19
20
Aerospace Medicine Advisory Committee Meeting; NASA Headquarters
Space Station Work Package #4 Rocketdyne Briefing; Cleveland
ASAP Annual Report to Administrator; NASA Headquarters
lntercenter Aircraft Operations Panel Meeting; Cocoa Beach
lntercenter Aircraft Operations Panel Meeting; Cocoa Beach
Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel; Washington, DC
Space Shuttle Orbiter Autoland; Johnson Space Center
Space Station Program; NASA Headquarters
Space Shuttle Program; NASA Headquarters
Office of Management and Budget; Washington, DC
NASA Safety Reporting Systems; NASA Headquarters
Aerospace Medicine Advisory Committee Meeting; NASA Headquarters
Space Station Restructure and Space Shuttle Main Engine; Rocketdyne,
Canoga Park
ASAP Management Meeting; NASA Headquarters
Space Shuttle Orbiter Autoland; Johnson Space Center
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JUNE (Cont.)
25 National Research Council Panel on Advanced Solid Rocket Motor;
Washington, DC
J__[JLY
16-17
AUGUST
5
6
6
7
9
12-13
20
21
21
Space Shuttle Launch and Landing Processing; Kennedy Space Center
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor; Aerojet, Sacramento
Aeronautical Programs and Human Performance; Ames Research Center
Space Shuttle Performance; Rockwell, Downey
Flight Programs; Dryden Flight Research Facility
Space Station Freedom Program, Level I; NASA Headquarters
Space Station Freedom Program, Level II; Reston
Space Shuttle Processing/Operations; Kennedy Space Center
Space Shuttle/Space Station Logistics, Kennedy Space Center
Advanced Turbopump Development Program; Pratt & Whitney, West Palm
Beach
SEPTEMBER
4-5
OCTOBER
9
9-10
16-17
18
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor/Advanced Solid Rocket Motor; Marshall
Space Flight Center
Space Station Work Package #4; Lewis Research Center
Space Shuttle Program Directors Management Review; Johnson Space
Center
Manned Space Flight Activities; Johnson Space Center
Space Station Integration; Johnson Space Center
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NOVEMBER
6-7
4-6
6-8
7
13
14
DECEMBER
4
10-11
NASA/Contractors Conference; Houston
AIAA 4th Space Logistics Symposium; Cocoa Beach
Integrated Logistics Panel; Kennedy Space Center
STS-44 Flight Readiness Review; Kennedy Space Center
Space Station Freedom, Work Package 2; McDonnell Douglas Company;
Huntington Beach
Human Factors, EVA; Ames Research Center
Tethered Satellite System; NASA Headquarters
Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel; San Diego
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